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Abstract
Have passive rentiers replaced the working rich at the top of the U.S. income dis-
tribution? Using income tax data linking 11 million firms to their owners, this paper
finds that private business owners who actively manage their firms are key for top in-
come inequality. Private business income accounts for most of the rise of top incomes
since 2000 and the majority of top earners receive private business income—most of
which accrues to active owner-managers of mid-market firms in relatively skill-intensive
and unconcentrated industries. Profit falls substantially after premature owner deaths.
Top-owned firms are twice as profitable per worker as other firms despite similar risk,
and rising profitability without rising scale explains most of their profit growth. To-
gether, these facts indicate that the working rich remain central to rising top incomes
in the twenty-first century.
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[The human capital hypothesis] is far less consequential than one might imagine.
There is little evidence that labor’s share in national income has increased signif-
icantly in a very long time: “non-human” capital seems almost as indispensable
in the twenty-first century as it was in the eighteenth or nineteenth, and there is
no reason why it may not become even more so. —Thomas Piketty (2014)
For a rich client whose reputation or fortune, or both, are at stake will scarcely
count any price too high to secure the services of the best man he can get: and
it is this again that enables jockeys and painters and musicians of exceptional
ability to get very high prices. —Alfred Marshall (1890)
In the last few decades of the twentieth century, the primary driver of rising top incomes
was labor income growth of the “working rich” (Piketty and Saez, 2003). Since then, rising
capital income has shifted focus to the possible renaissance of passive rentiers.1 Under-
standing the nature of top incomes is essential for explaining their evolution and assessing
policy implications. Have passive rentiers replaced the working rich at the top of the income
distribution?
This paper uses de-identified administrative tax data to characterize top incomes and
their rise in the twenty-first century. We begin with a little-known fact: nearly all of the
recent rise in directly observed top incomes has come in the form of business income.2 As a
share of top 0.1% income, business income now exceeds both non-business capital income and
wage income. Most of this top business income growth comes from private “pass-through”
businesses that are not taxed at the entity level; instead, income passes through to the owners
who pay taxes on their share of the firm’s income.3 This feature allows us to build a new
dataset linking firms to their owners for 11 million firms between 2001 and 2014, enabling
us to provide a novel perspective on the nature of top business income.
We use these data to test two key implications of the hypothesis that top earners are
passive rentiers: (1) firm performance does not depend on the owner’s active participation;
and (2) differences in business income across people and over time depend on differences
in the scale of business holdings rather than their profitability. Under the rentier hypoth-
1Piketty (2014) provides a comprehensive account of how passive wealth accumulation can lead to in-
creasing inequality. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) document rising capital shares in the U.S. and
internationally. Kopczuk and Saez (2004) use estate tax returns and Saez and Zucman (2016) use capi-
talized income flows to show wealth concentration in the U.S. has been increasing. Piketty and Zucman
(2014) document rising capital-output ratios in the U.S. and Europe. Rognlie (2016) argues that capital
accumulation cannot explain rising capital shares. See also Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2017).
2We focus throughout on market income from tax filings, i.e., fiscal income excluding realized capital
gains as in Piketty and Saez (2003), not imputed national income as in Piketty, Saez and Zucman (2018).
3Cooper, McClelland, Pearce, Prisinzano, Sullivan, Yagan, Zidar and Zwick (2016) document the increas-
ing role of pass-throughs in generating business income. Guvenen and Kaplan (2017) note that administrative
wage data do not show a recent rise in top income shares.
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esis, growing business income solely reflects differences in non-human factor accumulation
including capital, patents, and brands.4
The first part of the paper describes who earns business income and the salient features
of their firms. Most top earners are private business owners. In 2014, more than half of the
top 1% and nearly eighty percent of the top 0.1% earn some pass-through business income.
In absolute terms, that amounts to 947,000 business owners with total income over $386K
and 130,000 business owners with total income over $1.5M. Typical firms owned by the
top 1-0.1% are single-establishment firms in professional services (e.g., consultants, lawyers,
specialty tradespeople) or health services (e.g., physicians, dentists). A typical firm owned
by the top 0.1% might be a regional business with $20M in sales and 100 employees, such as
an auto dealer, beverage distributor, or a large law firm.
Four additional facts emerge. First, pass-through income is undiversified: it typically
derives from one firm with one to three owners and amounts to a large share of their total
income. Second, these owners appear to participate actively in firm operations. Their
age distribution closely mirrors that of prime age workers, and less than ten percent of
top owners report earning only passive income (i.e., income earned without hours engaged)
from their businesses. Third, most private business income derives from mid-market firms—
those with $5M to $500M in sales—and the distribution within industries is not especially
concentrated among a few large firms. These firms operate across diverse geographies and
sectors. Fourth, despite this diversity, most profits are earned in relatively labor-intensive
industries, especially in those that demand high-skilled labor. Together, these facts support
the notion that most top earners better resemble the working rich, not passive owners of
large stocks of accumulated capital.
The second part of the paper sheds light on the role top owners play in their firms’
performance. We develop a model of how business owners can affect firm performance and
use the model to frame empirical tests of the rentier hypothesis. In this part, we focus
our analysis to the population of S-corporations, the largest and most transparent form of
pass-through business.5 We present three findings that underscore the importance of human
factors of production embodied in top owners. The first finding is that premature owner
deaths cause a substantial decline in firm performance, which rejects a story in which top
4Views differ on the importance of heterogeneous returns to capital. Saez and Zucman (2016), for example,
consider uniform within asset class returns when capitalizing income flows, but others such as Bricker,
Henriques, Krimmel and Sabelhaus (2016) and Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino and Pistaferri (2016) emphasize
the importance of return heterogeneity, especially at the top.
5We focus on S-corporations because pyramidal and circular partnership structures make it difficult
to allocate partnership profits to owners (Cooper, McClelland, Pearce, Prisinzano, Sullivan, Yagan, Zidar
and Zwick, 2016) and because different accounting practices make it difficult to analyze partnership and
S-corporation performance using the same measure.
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owners are passive beneficiaries of firm profitability. In a sample of 2,509 deaths of non-
elderly top 1% owners, owner death causes a 61% decline in firm profits. Thus, top-owned
firms are not merely a collection of assets that generate profit independent of their ownership,
rather performance depends critically on the owner’s contribution of effort and human factors
of production.
The second finding is that top-owned firms generate superior profitability, which rejects
a story in which business income differences simply reflect differences in the size of business
holdings. The mean profitability of firms owned by the top 0.1% is over twice that of firms
owned by those in the 90-95th percentiles. The profitability advantage of top-owned firms is
a persistent characteristic of top earners: startups founded by individuals with high incomes
before founding the startup go on to enjoy superior profitability over the next five years.
Differences in risk do not account for heterogeneous profitability between top-owned and
non-top-owned firms.
The third finding is that rising profitability rather than rising scale explains rising top
business income, which rejects a story in which growing business income solely reflects non-
human capital accumulation. Between 2001 and 2014, both the profitability of top-owned
firms and the profitability advantage relative to non-top-owned firms grew dramatically.
While top-owned firm profitability rose over time, scale largely did not: approximately 80%
of the increase in top S-corporation income is due to rising profitability per unit of scale. This
rise in profitability was broad-based across sectors. Thus, in contrast to patterns observed
among public companies or in aggregate Census data, this rise did not coincide with a
dominant role of large “superstar” S-corporations.6
Our results inform four literatures. First, we find in our income tax data that most
capitalists in the twenty-first century are not passive rentiers but active owner-managers
of closely held firms who play a key role in their firms’ success. This finding differs from
recent work on top incomes, which has raised the possibility that the story of rising income
inequality in the twenty-first century is solely a story of rising passive capital income (Piketty,
2014; Piketty and Zucman, 2014; Piketty, Saez and Zucman, 2018). Two considerations
account for this difference. First, recent work assumes that all S-corporation income is
passive capital income, whereas we find that it is largely active labor income. Second, we
focus on standard income concepts that do not impute aggregate corporate retained earnings
and taxes to individuals (see Section 6.5). Rather than focusing only on the allocation of
top dollars, which can be skewed by the very top earners, our work also highlights how the
6Furman and Orszag (2015), Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2016), Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson and Reenen
(2017), and De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) document increasing dispersion in profitability among public
companies and within the manufacturing sector, which are not well represented in our S-corporation sample.
4
typical top earner earns her income.
Our findings are consistent with the earlier conclusion in Piketty and Saez (2003) that,
in the 1990s, the working rich were more prevalent than rentiers at the top of the income
distribution. More broadly, our findings are consistent with the view that the demand for
top skill has outpaced its supply, with the returns to top skill increasingly taking the form
of business income.7 However, we stress that returns to owner-manager skill need not be
socially optimal and can include returns to rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974; Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny, 1991) or elite connections (Fisman, 2001; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Zimmerman,
2017).
Second, this paper is among the first to document an explicit empirical link between
firm profitability and top income inequality. Separate literatures have documented firm-
and industry-level variation in profitability (Hall, 1988; Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson,
2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Syverson, 2011) and shown that firm-level variation in wage
premia contributes to wage inequality (Card, Heining and Kline, 2013; Song, Price, Guvenen,
Bloom and Von Wachter, 2015). We connect these ideas by showing that firm-level variation
in profitability amplifies top income inequality among firm owners, and that firm ownership
is a key channel through which firms matter for top income inequality.
Third, we find firm profitability is higher for top-owned firms in the U.S. Fagereng, Guiso,
Malacrino and Pistaferri (2016) document heterogeneous and persistent returns in Norway,
finding a key role for closely held firms at the top of the income distribution. Persistently
high returns to private business may be explained statistically by higher firm profitability,
with scale-limiting scarcity of skilled owner-manager effort being the underlying driver.8 Top
wealth estimates based on capitalized income flows and a constant returns assumption can
be improved by accounting for the higher profitability of top-owned firms.
Fourth, we contribute to a literature on the impact of taxes on economic measurement, the
composition of top incomes, and corporate organization.9 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 initi-
ated a steady tax-motivated migration of corporate activity out of traditional C-corporations
and into S-corporations, which together compose the U.S. corporate sector. Tax consider-
ations incentivize owner-managers of S-corporations to label their income as profits rather
7See Katz and Murphy (1992), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), Goldin and Katz (2009), and Murphy
and Topel (2016) for some prominent articulations of this view. Kaplan and Rauh (2013b) argue that the
broad-based rise in top incomes reflects market-driven forces, such as an increased return to skill.
8A recent literature has emphasized the importance of management practices for firm performance (Bloom
and Van Reenen, 2007; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie and Roberts, 2012;
Bender, Bloom, Card, Reenen and Wolter, 2016).
9See, e.g., Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994), Slemrod (1996), Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997), Gordon
and Slemrod (2000), Alstadster, Jacob, Kopczuk and Telle (2016), Auten and Splinter (2016), DeBacker and
Prisinzano (2015), Cooper, McClelland, Pearce, Prisinzano, Sullivan, Yagan, Zidar and Zwick (2016), Clarke
and Kopczuk (2017), Prisinzano and Pearce (2017), and Dyrda and Pugsley (2017).
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than wages. Two empirical approaches suggest that the decline in labor’s share of U.S.
corporate value-added (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014) is overstated by 16% as labor
payments have increasingly taken the form of S-corporate profits.10 For tax policy, our es-
timates imply that the ability of top earners to label their labor income as S-corporation
income and thereby avoid payroll taxes undermines the net progressivity of the U.S. tax sys-
tem and creates horizontal inequities between top earners. Moreover, behavioral responses
to “capital” income taxation will reflect a mix of capital and labor elasticities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 documents the importance of business income
for top income inequality. Section 2 describes the institutional background and data. Section
3 presents descriptive statistics on the prevalence of top business ownership and the sizes
and industries of those businesses. Section 4 presents a model of business income. Section 5
studies the effect of owner deaths on firm performance. Section 6 analyzes the profitability
of top-owned businesses in the cross section and the contribution of rising profitability to
rising top business income. Section 7 explores implications of disguised labor income for the
corporate labor share and tax policy. Section 8 concludes.
1 Business Income and Top Income Inequality
To motivate our investigation of top business income, we highlight a little-known fact: around
2000, the nature of rising top income changed from rising wage and salary income to rising
private business income.
Figure 1A uses the updated distributional statistics of Piketty and Saez (2003) to plot
the time series of directly observed top incomes.11 Figure 1A reprints the well-known U-
shape of U.S. top income shares from 1913 through 2015. The top 1% of households earned
nearly 20% of total income in the early twentieth century, less than 10% in the middle of
the century, and now nearly 20% once again. Top incomes in the early twentieth century
comprised mostly passive capital income like interest income, while rising top incomes of the
final two decades of the twentieth century comprised mostly wage income. Piketty and Saez
(2003) conclude that, at the top of the income distribution, the working rich had replaced
10Work on the decline in the labor share (e.g., Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)) often restricts attention
to the corporate sector to mitigate measurement problems associated with classifying self-employment income
as labor or capital income (Gollin, 2002; Elsby, Hobijn and S¸ahin, 2013). We show these issues also matter
for measuring factor income shares in the corporate sector.
11This data series measures households as personal income tax filing units, imputes non-filing units with
incomes too low to require a tax filing, and measures market income as total personal tax return income
(“fiscal income”) minus unemployment compensation, taxable Social Security benefits, and realized capital
gains. Piketty, Saez and Zucman (2018), Auten and Splinter (2016), and Larrimore, Mortenson and Splinter
(2017) study how top income shares vary when the unit of observation is a household or an individual instead
of a tax filing unit.
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the “coupon-clipping” rentiers prevalent in Marx’s era.
Figure 1B reveals that rising top wage income ceded to rising top capital income after
2000. This figure uses the underlying source of Figure 1A to decompose the top 1% series of
Figure 1A into two income types: wage income and capital income, which includes business
income, interest, rents, royalties, estates, trusts, and other capital income. Top 1% wage
income as a share of total income rose through 2000 but has since flattened. In contrast, top
1% capital income as a share of total income doubled since 1990, with most of that growth
coming after 2000. Thus, rising capital income accounts for roughly all of the observed
growth in the top 1% income share since 2000.
Figure 1C shows that the vast majority of rising top capital income came in the form
of private business income. As we detail in Section 2, there are three major business
organizational forms in the United States: C-corporations, S-corporations, and partner-
ships. The vast majority of publicly traded businesses are C-corporations while nearly all
C-corporations, all S-corporations, and nearly all partnerships are private. Figure 1C decom-
poses the top 1% capital income series of Figure 1B into business income from C-corporations
(in the form of dividends), business income from private “pass-through” firms (S-corporations
and partnerships), and other capital income (e.g., interest, rents, royalties, estates, trusts,
etc.). While top business income rose as a share of total income since 2000, most of this
growth took the form of S-corporation and partnership income, rather than C-corporation
dividend income, with S-corporation income being the largest category. Top 1% other capital
income declined slightly since 1990 and has been flat since 2000. Appendix Figures A.1 and
A.2 show similar patterns for the top 0.1%, for whom business income now exceeds both
non-business capital income and wage income.
In short, private business income has played a central role in rising top income inequality
in the twenty-first century. We therefore focus our empirical investigation into the nature of
top business income and why it is rising.
2 Data on Firms Linked to Owners and Workers
This section describes the relevant institutional background and our primary data, which
links S-corporations and partnerships to their owners and workers from 2001 to 2014.
2.1 How U.S. Businesses Are Organized and Taxed
Historically, U.S. business activity was largely organized in one of two forms: sole proprietor-
ships (accounting for 25% of 1985 taxable business income) or C-corporations (accounting
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for 75%) (Cooper, McClelland, Pearce, Prisinzano, Sullivan, Yagan, Zidar and Zwick, 2016;
Clarke and Kopczuk, 2017).12 C-corporations (named “C” after their subchapter of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code) are incorporated and officially registered business entities. C-corporations
may be owned by individuals, businesses, non-profits, and foreigners. C-corporations are dis-
tinct legal entities whose owners enjoy limited liability. C-corporations pay the corporate
income tax on annual taxable income, and taxable shareholders pay dividend taxes on divi-
dends and capital gains taxes on gains realized from selling shares.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the top ordinary personal income tax rate below the
top corporate income tax rate for the first time in the post-war era, unleashing a dramatic
rise in business activity conducted in “pass-through” business form. By 2011, 54.2% of
U.S. taxable business income was earned by pass-throughs and sole proprietorships and only
45.8% by C-corporations (Cooper, McClelland, Pearce, Prisinzano, Sullivan, Yagan, Zidar
and Zwick, 2016). Pass-through businesses typically enjoy limited liability but, unlike C-
corporations, pay no entity-level tax. Instead, taxable business income “passes through” to
shareholders’ tax returns and is taxed as personal ordinary income on Form 1040, Schedule
E, in the year it is earned by the firm. This tax burden applies regardless of whether the firm
actually distributes the income to shareholders. When distributed, pass-through dividends
are untaxed.
As of 2014, the dominant pass-through type is the S-corporation (named after its sub-
chapter of the Internal Revenue Code). S-corporations have the same legal structure as C-
corporations but are taxed differently. Since 1986, S status has been tax-superior, but legal
restrictions prevent corporations with more than 100 owners, with owners who are not U.S.
individuals, and with more than one class of stock from enjoying S status. These restrictions
bar public corporations, corporations with institutional equity financing, and corporations
with sophisticated divisions between ownership and control such as multiple stock classes
from being S-corporations. There are now more S-corporations than C-corporations, even
among firms with over $500M in revenue. Publicly-known examples of S-corporations with
billions in revenue include Fidelity Investments and home improvement retailer Menards.13
Partnerships are the other major pass-through type. Partnerships are taxed similarly
to S-corporations but are subject to partnership law rather than corporate law and can be
owned by any type of individual or business entity. Publicly-known examples of partnerships
with billions in revenue include Goldman Sachs before its 1999 initial public offering and the
12Sole proprietorships are unincorporated business entities owned by individual taxpayers. Their annual
income is taxed at ordinary personal income tax rates at the owner level on Form 1040, Schedule C. Sole
proprietors lack limited liability and sole proprietorship dividends are not taxed.
13Nelson (2016) provides a detailed account of how rules governing S-corporations have evolved over time
and have generally made adopting this form more favorable.
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U.S. arm of PricewaterhouseCoopers. Many financial and real estate investors structure their
firms as partnerships as well.
Under current law, taxes encourage firms meeting the above ownership limitations to file
taxes as an S-corporation, rather than as a C-corporation or a partnership.14 Considering
only current federal taxes for simplicity, C-corporations pay the corporate income tax, which
is a nearly flat 35% rate on their annual taxable income, and their owners are liable for the
dividend income tax or capital gains tax (23.8% in the top personal bracket, which includes
the 2013 Affordable Care Act (ACA) surtax of 3.8% on investment income) on the remaining
65% of income when it is distributed to owners. These taxes amount to an estimated all-in
top tax rate on C-corporations of 44.7%.15 Partnerships typically enjoy lower taxes than
identical C-corporations: annual partnership income is taxed at the owner level at ordinary
income tax rates, payroll tax rates, and ACA Additional Medicare Tax rates (totaling 43.4%
at the top), with no other income taxes or taxes on distributions.
S-corporations usually face the weakly lowest taxes. S-corporation income is taxed iden-
tically to partnership income, except that if the owner “materially participates” in the firm’s
operation, the income is classified as actively earned income and faces only the ordinary
income tax (39.6% at the top). Owners determine their material participation status, which
typically requires the owner to supply at least 500 hours of labor to the firm in the year the
income was earned. Owners face tax incentives to classify themselves as material participants
in order for their income to be deemed active and face lower taxes.16 Note that whereas a
partnership owner typically faces identical taxes when receiving her income as W-2 wage
income and business income, an S-corporation owner faces lower taxes when receiving her
income as business income.17
14In order to file as an S-corporation, a firm must be organized at the state level as either a corporation or
a limited liability company (LLC). An LLC is treated as a partnership by the court system but can choose
to be treated as an S-corporation by the tax system and thus file an S-corporation income tax return if the
LLC satisfies the S-corporation ownership requirements.
15Economists typically assume that half of distributions face the statutory dividend tax rate while the
other half is taxed at one quarter of the capital gains tax rate due to tax deferral from retained earnings and
other avoidance. The estimate 44.7% equals 35% + 65%× (.5× 23.8% + .5× 14 × 23.8%).
16An S-corporation owner-manager’s W-2 compensation is required to be “reasonable” and to reflect the
market-value of labor services. The IRS rarely adjusts tax liabilities by deeming W-2 compensation to
be unreasonable. Before the Net Investment Income Tax of 2013 that assessed a surtax on passive but not
active S-corporation income, the incentive to declare one’s S-corporation income as active rather than passive
was limited to deducting active losses from one’s other active income like wage and salary income. Auten,
Splinter and Nelson (2016) document shifting of passive to active S-corporation income in response to the
2013 change.
17Litigation considerations also tend to favor corporate form over partnership form. Legal certainty is often
higher in corporate form than in partnership (or LLC) form: corporate form is older than partnership form,
so corporate law is more settled. Corporate form also provides more assurance that relatively well-known
federal law will be used to adjudicate civil complaints, rather than lesser-known state law. For example, if a
New Jersey citizen sues a partnership and the partnership has at least one partner who is also a New Jersey
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2.2 Samples
Due to the legal requirements mentioned above, S-corporations are owned directly by U.S.
individuals rather than through complicated ownership tiers and are taxed at the owner
level. The U.S. government receives annual information linking all S-corporations to their
owners in order to administer owner-level taxation of S-corporation income. We use this
information to build our main sample.
Our main sample comprises the universe of S-corporations linked to owners and workers
using de-identified data from income tax records spanning 2001-2014. Universal data are
available only from 2001-2014. We construct the sample as follows.
We first merge the population of S-corporation business income tax returns (Form 1120S)
to the population of S-corporation information returns (Form 1120S, Schedule K-1) that
link the firms to their owners. These information returns detail each owner’s share of the
corporation’s income. S-corporations are required to submit to the Internal Revenue Service
a K-1 on behalf of each owner of the S-corporation when the corporation submits its Form
1120S business income tax return. Each owner receives a copy of her K-1, which she uses to
report S-corporation income on her Form 1040, Schedule E, and compute her tax liability.
Each 1120S includes the firm’s masked Employer Identification Number (EIN), and each
K-1 includes the firm’s masked EIN as well as the owner’s masked Social Security Number
(SSN). We merge the 1120S records onto the K-1 records by masked EIN in order to yield
linked firm-owner data.
We further merge on information from two additional sources: Form 1040 individual
income tax returns and Form W-2 wage information returns. In order to rank owners by
their percentile in the annual personal income distribution, we merge the firm-owner data by
masked SSN to annual 1040 records. In order to measure firm scale, we merge on the annual
number of W-2s with the firm’s masked EIN listed as the W-2’s payer. All data sources are
in principle universal. We remove observations in which the firm has non-positive sales.
For the analysis of Section 3, we append linked partnership returns to our main sam-
ple in order to construct our full sample. The partnership rows comprise the population
merge of partnership business income tax returns (Form 1065) to the population of part-
nership information returns (Form 1065, Schedule K-1). Unlike S-corporations, partnerships
can be owned by individuals and entities other than U.S. individuals. We focus on direct
partnership-owner links in which the partner is a U.S. individual. Thus, many partnerships
are omitted from the Section 3 analysis. Sections 5 and 6 use the main sample, where links
are nearly universal.
citizen, a New Jersey state court will hear the case. But if the firm had been a corporation that was neither
headquartered nor incorporated in New Jersey, a U.S. district court would hear the case.
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The full sample comprises 158.0M firm-owner-year observations—71.8M S-corporation-
owner-year observations and 86.2M partnership-owner-year observations—on 11.0M unique
firms (7.3M S-corporations and 3.9M partnerships with minimal overlap from corporate form
switching) with 20.1M unique owners (9.8M S-corporation owners and 12.8M partnership
owners with some overlap). In 2014, the main sample comprises 5.7M S-corporation-owner
observations on 3.7M S-corporations and 4.9M owners. In 2014, the partnership observations
in the full sample comprise 9.4M partnership-owner observations on 1.4M partnerships and
5.2M owners. Section 3 presents detailed descriptive statistics.
2.3 Variables
We now define variables in our full sample. All variables are annual and are available
in all years. Year refers to calendar year, which by law is also each S-corporation’s and
partnership’s fiscal year. All dollar values are inflated to 2014 dollars using the CPI-U.
1. Firm-level. A firm is an S-corporation or partnership. Sales is the firm’s operating
revenue (gross sales minus returns) as listed on the 1120S or 1065. Passively earned income
(e.g., interest on bank deposits) is excluded. Profits is the firm’s ordinary business income,
equal to operating revenue minus costs as listed on the 1120S or 1065. Costs equals the
sum of inputs (cost of goods sold), employee and owner wage compensation, rent, interest,
capital asset tax depreciation, and other deductions related to ordinary business. Profits are
divided among owners pro rata according to ownership stakes on Forms K-1, which owners
then include on their Form 1040, Schedule E. Hence, except for Form 1040 loss limitations,
profits are exactly the S-corporation and partnership income concept that Figure 1C shows
had more than doubled among the top 1% of U.S. households since 1990.18
Profits per worker equals profits divided by the number of workers. Number of workers
and number of employees equals the number of individuals who received a W-2 from the
firm that year. Industry is the four-digit North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) code reported by the firm on its 1120S or 1065 as corresponding to its principal
business activity. A firm is a top-owned firm if it has an owner in the top 1% or top 0.1% of
the income distribution as defined below.
18Partnership profits are not always divided according to ownership stakes. Furthermore, as partnerships
do not face a reasonable compensation requirement, in general all active owner labor compensation will be
reported as profits for partnerships. In contrast, for S-corporations, some active owner labor compensation
will be reported as wages, which will tend to understate the magnitude of income derived from active business
participation when considering profits alone (Nelson, 2016).
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2. Owner-level. Personal income is the main income concept used in Piketty and Saez
(2003) and equals Form 1040 total income minus Form 1040 capital gains minus Form 1040
unemployment compensation minus Form 1040 taxable social security benefits. A firm owner
is a top 1% owner, a top 1-0.1% owner, or a top 0.1% owner if her personal income lies in
a year’s top 1%, the top 1% but not the top 0.1%, or the top 0.1% of all tax units in
the year, respectively. Wage income equals W-2 income. S-corporation income equals the
owner’s share of the profits from all S-corporations she owns. Total owner payments equals
S-corporation income plus wage income from the S-corporations she owns, as reflected in
merged W-2 records. Partnership income and owner payments in the Appendix Table A.1
are defined analogously. Business income is total pass-through business income and equals
total Form 1040, Schedule E income. An owner’s S-corporation income is active if the owner
reports she materially participates in the operations of any of her pass-through businesses
(see the previous subsection) and is passive otherwise.
Our personal income definition excludes both realized and unrealized capital gains from
the definition of income, following a long tradition in national income accounting and the
inequality literature.19 The structure of certain forms of income introduces two additional
considerations. First, if employees are paid in stock options, the value of those options should
be included in national income, as it reflects compensation for labor supply. Fortunately, the
accounting rules for stock options require that capital gains for realized in-the-money stock
options be included in taxable wage and salary income, so they are reflected in fiscal income.
Second, a similar argument applies to the “carried interest” capital gains earned by partners
in financial partnerships (such as venture capital, buyout, and hedge fund investors), which
usually reflects compensation for labor supply. Since we cannot distinguish this compensation
from other capital gains, carried interest is not included in our fiscal income measure.20
19Kuznets (1941) offers three reasons why capital gains should be excluded from income. First, asset price
changes, whether realized or unrealized, do not directly add to the flow of goods and services produced by
the economy. Second, asset price changes may reflect changes driven by previous activity (such as reinvested
earnings) that is already included in national income. Section 6.5 discusses how the allocation of retained
earnings may affect the relative importance of top pass-through income. Third, changes in asset prices due
to random fluctuations may distort the measurement of economic activity. The cyclical volatility of capital
gains and lumpiness of capital gains realizations is likely a key reason why the composition of top earners
when sorted by total cash income exhibits substantial turnover (Auten and Gee, 2009; Auten, Gee and
Turner, 2013). In our data, realized capital gains exhibit strong cyclical sensitivity with no obvious trend
since the late 1990s.
20Data from Metrick and Yasuda (2010) indicate that carried interest accounts for only one third of total
income for these investors, with the rest appearing as ordinary income. Furthermore, the size of the industry
estimated by Kaplan and Rauh (2009) implies that carried interest accounts for a small share of total realized
capital gains. For these reasons, carried interest, while very relevant for certain top earners, likely does not
substantially alter the composition of top earners.
12
2.4 Auxiliary Data
The main sample begins in 2001. In order to analyze a longer time series and also to compare
S-corporation activity to C-corporation activity, we supplement our main sample with the
Statistics of Income (SOI) sample of corporate income tax returns from 1993-2014.21 We
use data from W-2 forms to measure wage payments to individual owners and to calculate
firm-level aggregates of the total number of employees at the firm.
3 Business Ownership in the Top 1%
This section describes who earns business income and the salient features of their firms. We
ask whether owners actively participate in their firms’ operations and whether their firms
are more prevalent in skill-intensive industries where talent is likely an important factor.
3.1 The Prevalence of Business Ownership in the Top 1%
Figures 2A and 2B demonstrate the prevalence of pass-through business income among
the top 1% and top 0.1% of earners in 2014 using the full sample of firm-owner-linked S-
corporations and partnerships. Top 1% households had personal income over $386,000 while
top 0.1% households had personal income over $1.5M. The graph shows that pass-through
ownership is widespread among top earners. Among the top 1%, 57% earn pass-through
income. That is nearly 1 million taxpayers, with aggregate pass-through business income
of $474B. Among the top 0.1%, 79% earn pass-through income. That is 130,000 taxpayers,
with aggregate pass-through business income of $264B. For comparison, in Execucomp, the
top 9,900 executives working at the S&P 1500 earned a combined $32B. Figures 2C and
2D present analogous statistics on these owners’ pass-through share of personal income and
show that these owners derive substantial income from their businesses. The average pass-
through owner in both the top 1% and the top 0.1% earns nearly half of their income from
their pass-through businesses.
The panels of Figure 2 break down pass-through ownership and income into firm size
ranges. Approximately half of top 1% and three-quarters of top 0.1% owners own a business
with more than $5M in sales, and over half of the pass-through income of both groups derives
from firms with between $5M and $500M in sales. Figure 3A focuses on our main sample of
linked S-corporations in 2014 to document that most S-corporation owners are middle-age
and pre-retirement. The population of S-corporation owners does not include very many old
people or children, whom we might associate with estates and inherited wealth. Figures 3B
21See Yagan (2015) and Zwick and Mahon (2017) for detail on these weighted, stratified random samples.
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and 3C show that S-corporations have a similar size distribution as C-corporations except at
the very top of the size distribution, and that S-corporation income is earned across states
approximately proportionately to population, respectively.22
3.2 Statistics on Top Owners and Top-Owned Firms
Table 1 provide summary statistics of annual averages from the main sample for S-corporations
and their owners, elaborating on the total counts reported in Section 2.2. Panel A presents
statistics on distinct firm-year observations, while Panel B presents statistics on distinct
owner-year observations. In the pooled main sample of all S-corporations 2001-2014, the
average S-corporation earned $93K in profits on sales of $1.8M in 2014 dollars, employed 14
workers, and had 1.6 owners. S-corporations that have at least one owner whose income is
in the top 0.1% are much larger and more profitable—these firms earned $1.6M in profits
on $22.4M in sales with 103 employees and 3.4 owners on average. On a per worker and per
owner basis, top-0.1%-owned firms have superior performance. The average top-0.1%-owned
S-corporation generates $139K in profits per worker, $818K in profits per owner, and $950K
in profits plus owner wage payments per owner. Top-0.1%-owned S-corporations are over
five times more profitable per worker and per owner than the average S-corporation.
Owner income varies widely. The average S-corporation owner’s income is $212K and the
P10-90 range is $15K-422K. The average age of owners is 50 with a P10-90 range of 35-66.
The average owner earns the same amount in business income ($72K) as in wage income
($71K). 11.4% of owners are in the top 1% of personal income and 1.8% are in the top 0.1%
of personal income. Owners in the top 0.1% are five years older than the average owner
across all S-corporations. Top 0.1% owners earn $4.5M in personal income on average, and
earn $1.8M in total wage and business income from the S-corporations that they own. The
average top-0.1% owner earns a majority of her income in the form of pass-through business
income (53%). Just 5% of top-0.1% owners report earning only passive income from their
pass-throughs.
Most S-corporations owned by top earners have few owners and most top S-corporation
owners own just one firm, indicating that this activity is closely held and undiversified. S-
corporation ownership is not held via big portfolios of diversified holdings, which we might
expect if owners were only contributing capital. This fact is consistent with the share of
S-corporation activity along the firm size distribution. In order to make substantial income
22Appendix Figures A.3 and A.4 show how the distributions of firm sales and profits have evolved among
C-corporations, S-corporations, and top-owned S-corporations. The distribution of C-corporations has sub-
stantially more concentration in the right tail, with more than 90% of 2014 profits accounted for by firms
with more than $500M in sales; in contrast, approximately 10% of total S-corporation profits and 20% of
top 0.1% S-corporation profits in 2014 are accounted for by firms in this size bin.
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as a minority passive owner, one would need to be a minority owner of a very large company,
yet most top-0.1%-owned companies in our data are mid-market in size with average sales
of $22M. To reach the top 1% or top 0.1% with this kind of firm requires concentrated
ownership. Consistent with this claim, 93% of top 1-0.1% owners and 95% of top 0.1%
owners report their income as actively earned.23 See Appendix Table A.1 for qualitatively
similar summary statistics on partnerships and their owners from the partnerships subset of
our full sample.
3.3 The Industry Composition of Top Firms
Figure 3D compares the distribution of total profits across 1-digit NAICS sectors of top-
owned S-corporations to the distributions for all S-corporations and C-corporations for the
year 2014. S-corporation profits are earned broadly across sectors and are similarly dis-
tributed as overall corporate profits. The exception is that S-corporation profits are under-
represented in manufacturing and overrepresented in information, professional services, and
health care.
Table 2 presents a more disaggregated analysis of S-corporation profits for 30 industries,
sorted by the 2014 level of profits among firms with a top 0.1% owner.24 For these industries,
we also present the level of profits and within-group rank for firms with a top 1-0.1% owner
and for all S-corporations. Our focus on the industries of top-owned firms complements
Bakija, Cole and Heim (2012), who study the occupations of top earners using personal
income tax returns and find a large role for professional services, finance, and closely held
business.
The top 30 industries compose 56.4% and 61.5%, respectively, of top 1-0.1% and top
0.1% income. Among the top 0.1%, the five largest industries are management of compa-
nies and enterprises ($12.9B), other financial investment activity ($7.8B), automobile deal-
ers ($6.5B), other professional and technical services ($5.2B), and oil and gas extraction
($4.4B). Among the top 1-0.1%, the five largest industries are offices of physicians ($9.0B),
other professional and technical services ($4.9B), offices of dentists ($4.4B), other specialty
trade contractors ($4.3B), and legal services ($3.5B). Typical firms owned by the top 1-0.1%
23As further evidence consistent with active participation among working age owners, Appendix Figure
A.5 shows how passive versus active reporting and aggregate business income earned vary over time by owner
age. Owners above 80 are much more likely to report earning only passive income than younger owners,
while owners aged between 40 and 70 account for the majority of business income earned overall.
24Some firms may have both top and non-top owners. The approach in Table 2 allocates profits based on
whether any owners are in the top group. Appendix Table A.2 presents analogous statistics that apportion
S-corporation profits pro rata to owners in either the top 0.1% or the top 1-0.1% and then aggregate those
apportioned profits by industry. Because S-corporations are closely held, this alternative approach does not
materially alter the aggregates.
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are single-establishment firms in professional services (e.g., consultants, lawyers, specialty
tradespeople) or health services (e.g., physicians, dentists). A typical firm owned by the
top 0.1% might be a regional business with $20M in sales and 100 employees, such as an
auto dealer, beverage distributor, or a large law firm. For both groups, 17 of the top 20 in-
dustries are outside finance, and management of companies and enterprises often represents
non-financial activity as well.25 Thus, most top S-corporation businesses do not operate in
finance and instead actively produce goods or services across diverse industries.
Table 3 presents statistics comparing the level of S-corporation profits to partnership
profits among top-owned firms in 2014 for the top thirty industries in Table 2. In terms
of industry composition, there is substantial overlap between top S-corporations and top
partnerships. However, partnership profits skew more toward high skilled services, especially
other financial investment activity ($40.9B)—which includes private equity, venture capital,
and hedge funds—and legal services ($38.6B). These two industries account for 65.7% of the
$121B of total partnership profits among firms with a top 0.1% owner in 2014.26
The facts that top S-corporation profits predominate outside of manufacturing and that
the list of top-1-0.1% industries are high-skilled service industries suggests that top-owned
S-corporations are relatively skill intensive. Figures 4A and 4B systematize this observation
by presenting a set of pairwise correlations at the NAICS 4-digit level comparing top 1% and
top 0.1% profit levels to industry-level measures of skill intensity and other characteristics.
The first four rows of each graph present correlations of profits with measures of industry
skill intensity. Row 1 shows correlations with the skill share of employment, defined as
the average share of workers in an industry with some college education from the March
supplement of the Current Population Survey from the years 2000 through 2014. Row 2
shows correlations with the average annual wage compensation per worker among firms with
a top owner, based on our main sample. Row 3 shows correlations with the officer share of
labor compensation, defined as follows. For each S-corporation in the SOI corporate sample,
we divide officer compensation by the sum of officer compensation, salaries and wages, labor
contribution to cost of goods solds, and pension and benefit contributions. The officer share
of labor compensation is the sales-weighted average of this variable for all S-corporations
between 2000 and 2014. Row 4 shows correlations with the average share of workers using
25Holding companies often own related but formally distinct non-financial firms, such as a dairy producer
and a dairy distributor.
26Appendix Table A.3 presents analogous statistics that apportion S-corporation and partnership profits
pro rata to owners in either the top 0.1% or the top 1-0.1% and then aggregates those apportioned profits by
industry. Top partnerships (e.g., large law firms with both junior and senior partners) include many more
owners than do top S-corporations, so this exercise reallocates roughly 40% of the top 0.1% profits to the
top 1-0.1% category. Appendix Table A.4 presents statistics on the number of firms and owners for both
S-corporations and partnerships in each industry in Table 3.
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a computer at work between 2000 and 2014, measured in the October Current Population
Survey. All four skill correlations with both top 1% profits and top 0.1% profits are strongly
positive and statistically significant.
The strongly positive correlations between top S-corporation profits and industry-level
skill measures contrast with insignificant or negative correlations with other industry-level
characteristics. We use the SOI sample to construct sales Herfindahls in each 4-digit indus-
try, including both C- and S-corporations. This proxy for market concentration is negatively
correlated with both top 1% and top 0.1% S-corporation profits, implying that market power
at the national product-market level is unlikely to explain the rise in top incomes. Workers
per firm is the number of aggregate S-corporation W-2 payees employed by the average top
firms. This measure of firm scale also is negatively correlated with profits. Capital per
worker is the total book value of depreciable assets less accumulated depreciation divided
by aggregate W-2 payees. Capital is measured as the average for all S-corporations in the
SOI corporate sample betweeen 2000 and 2014, weighted to represent the population. Ag-
gregate W-2 payees is measured directly for the population of S-corporations. We rely on
data from Compustat to measure the intensity with which firms in different industries rely
on intellectual property (proxied by R&D expenditures) or brand capital (proxied by ad-
vertising expenditures). For these variables, we compute the share of total public company
expenditures in that category accounted for by public companies in that industry. We then
compute the mean of this share over the years between 2000 and 2014. We measure inter-
national market presence as the 2000-2014 average of total foreign net income reported by
S-corporations on Schedule M3 of their tax return divided by the 2000-2014 average of total
S-corporation profits. These correlations are mostly negative or statistically insignificant.
Together, this section’s descriptive statistics confirm the prediction that a large share
of top earners are active owner-managers of mid-market firms in relatively skill-intensive
and unconcentrated industries. Pass-through participation is pervasive among top earners
who are working age and own undiversifed positions in closely held firms. The correlates
analysis and statistics for top S-corporation industries suggest that many of these firms are in
industries that are neither capital-intensive nor reliant on intellectual property and patents.
For these firms, it is difficult to think of what other factors a passive owner would provide.
That this activity is in many sectors, all states roughly proportional to population, and in
firms that are not especially large is further at odds with passive capital stories that imply
the most profitable activity would also be concentrated among a few firms.
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4 Model of Business Income
This section introduces a model of how owners generate business income. We use the model
to (1) clarify the channels through which business owners can affect firm performance, (2)
explain profitability differences and constraints to expansion, and (3) discuss assumptions
under which the effects of owner deaths can help identify parameters of economic interest.
Supply. Each firm j with owner i has a technology for producing a differentiated good or
service,
yj(i) = f(Lj(i), Kj(i), Ej(i)) = AjL
αL
j(i)K
αK
j(i)E
αE
j(i), (1)
where Aj is productivity, Lj(i) is the number of workers, Kj(i) is units of physical capital,
Ej(i) is entrepreneurial effort of owner i, and αL + αK + αE ≤ 1 are output elasticities.27
Aj should be interpreted broadly as including all forms of non-physical capital that remain
transferable, such as intangible assets, patents, and brands. The entrepreneur i maximizes
her utility U(Lj(i), Kj(i), Ej(i)) by choosing the optimal amount of workers, capital, and effort:
max
Lj(i),Kj(i),Ej(i)
pj(i)AjL
αL
j(i)K
αK
j(i)E
αE
j(i) − wLj(i) − rKj(i) − ψ(Ej(i)/θj(i)), (2)
where pj(i) is the price of the good produced by firm j, w and r are factor prices that are
common across all firms, and effort disutility is ψ(E/θ) = (E/θ)1+
1
ε , where θj(i) parameterizes
owner i’s talent. Talented owners can provide more effort at a given utility cost. Note that
equation 2 defines the firm’s economic profits, not the firm’s accounting profits as measured
in tax data.28 In practice, owners often do not fully compensate themselves with wage
payments for their effort costs, yielding high accounting profits that partially reflect owner
effort compensation.
Demand. Demand yj(i) = Dj(i)p
ηj(i)
j(i) is a function of a demand shifter Dj(i), which depends
on market size and product appeal, price pj(i), and a demand elasticity ηj(i) < −1.
27Each component of the model (e.g., output elasticities) could depend on the owner i, but to declutter
notation, we do not explicitly add subscripts unless highlighting a channel through which owners matter.
28If owners own the capital rather than renting it at cost rKj(i), then accounting profits will include the
normal return to capital.
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Profitability. After paying factors based on their importance in the production process,
firm owners obtain economic profits pij(i), which are a residual share of sales.
29 Thus, forces
that increase sales such as appealing products Dj(i), technology Aj, and owner talent θj(i)
will increase profits. Profitability, which we measure as profits per worker, is given by:
pij(i)
Lj(i)
=
 11 + 1ηj(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Markup
−
(
αL + αK +
αE
1 + 1
εj(i)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective returns to scale
 wαL (3)
Equation 3 highlights two channels through which profitability can rise with owner talent.
On the demand side, if firm owners can make demand for their firm’s services less elastic,
then they can enjoy higher profitability. One mechanism for this possibility is through
larger firm scale—firms of talented owners are bigger and have higher market share, which
makes product demand ηj(i) less elastic and yields higher profitability (see Appendix B.2).
30
Profitability can also vary for technological reasons. Talent-intensive firms with relatively low
returns to non-owner labor and capital will enjoy high profitability. For example, in NAICS
7115, independent artists, writers, and performers generated $1.9 billion in top 1% profits
with 3.3 workers per firm and 14,668 workers overall in 2014. The effective returns to scale
also depend on the elasticity of owner effort εj(i). If owner effort is not infinitely elastic, then
increasingly costly owner effort constrains firm scale. Similar to ηj(i), εj(i) can also become less
elastic at higher scale if, for example, high effort levels are especially costly. Additionally,
private businesses may be regionally focused businesses with diminishing returns to scale
outside the regional market. These scale-based forces may enable talented entrepreneurs to
generate higher profitability. Finally, observed accounting profitability will exceed economic
profitability if some compensation for owner effort is paid as profits rather than owner wages.
Empirical Predictions. We use the model to derive empirical tests and discuss assump-
tions under which these tests help identify economic parameters of interest.
1. The passive owner hypothesis: αE = 0. Under this hypothesis, firm performance
29When profits exceed fixed costs, optimizing firms make scale decisions such that factor prices equal
the value of the marginal products, implying that factor payments are wLj(i) = αL
(
1
η + 1
)
pj(i)yj(i) and
rKj(i) = αK
(
1
η + 1
)
pj(i)yj(i), and compensation for owner effort amounts to
αE
1+ 1ε
(
1
η + 1
)
pj(i)yj(i). Thus,
pij(i) =
[
1−
(
αL + αK +
αE
1+ 1ε
)(
1
η + 1
)]
pj(i)yj(i). Appendix B.1 provides expressions for profits, firm scale,
economic factor payments, and factor shares in terms of primitives.
30Another scale-based mechanism for higher profitability, for example, is that talented owners can spread
their higher sales and profits over fixed costs. Profitability can vary across firms for additional reasons:
non-linear production technologies, input quality heterogeneity, risk, factor market frictions, etc.
19
is independent of owner effort. For example, tenants of an apartment building may
continue to pay rent checks regardless of the owner. We can test this null empirically
by estimating the effect of premature owner deaths on firm profits. Furthermore, and
similar to the logic of Hall (1988), the marginal effect of effort on sales is: ∂Sales
∂E
=
αE
(
1 + 1
η
)
Sales
E
. Thus, under our modeling assumptions, the sales elasticity with
respect to owner effort equals αE
(
1 + 1
η
)
, enabling us to test the null hypothesis by
testing whether the sales elasticity is zero. Moreover, dividing the sales elasticity by(
1 + 1
η
)
provides a quantitative estimate of the importance of entrepreneurial effort
αE.
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2. The accumulation hypothesis: Under this hypothesis, firms enjoy constant returns
to scale with constant unit costs, enabling them to accumulate as much capital as their
product demand merits. This view contrasts with the scarcity view, in which unit costs
increase with scale due to the imperfectly elastic supply of inputs such as owner effort.
Consider, for example, a physician’s office (or law firm, computer systems design firm,
or economic consultancy). If the demand for firm output doubles (i.e., Dj ⇑), it can
hire twice as many nurses and administrators, purchase twice as much office space
and equipment, but will struggle to double the lead doctor’s effort, especially if she
is already working 70 hours per week. Consequently, the firm will respond largely by
raising prices rather than by increasing output.32 We imagine the same constraint
binding for talented managers of firms across diverse industries. Thus, similar to the
argument of Katz and Murphy (1992), the evolution of output prices and quantities
can provide evidence that points to an important role for a scale-limiting factor like
the effort of skilled owner-managers.
5 The Impact of Owner Deaths
This section tests the rentier hypothesis—that firm performance is independent of owner
effort—by testing whether the death of a non-elderly owner affects firm performance. We
find that the average premature owner death causes a 61% decline in firm profits.
31Under the rentier null, all components affecting firm sales — appeal Dj , productivity Aj , labor Lj , and
capital Kj — are independent of the owner’s effort Ej . However, a more reliable estimate of αE requires
adjusting for changes in other inputs when the firm scales down. In Appendix B.3, we show that this factor
adjustment term can be identified by multiplying the non-owner factor share by the employment elasticity.
32Price increases pˆj =
Dˆj−Sˆj
S−η are the net shock to demand scaled by the sum of supply and demand
elasticities and the quantity increases yˆj =
−ηSˆj+SDˆj
S−η are an elasticity-weighted average of the shocks.
Appendix B.4 shows how S relates to αE and ε, and how Sj relates to TFP, talent, and factor prices.
Appendix B.5 discusses potential forces limiting the responsiveness of firm entry to profit increases.
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5.1 Owner Deaths Analysis Sample and Variable Definitions
We construct an owner deaths analysis sample—comprising firms with owner deaths matched
to firms without owner deaths—as follows. We obtain owner year of death from Social
Security Administration files housed alongside tax records, linked to our main sample. We
refer to a firm-owner-year observation in the main sample as experiencing a year-t owner
death when: (a) the owner was aged 64 or younger at the end of year t and had t−1 personal
income in the top 1%; (b) the owner died in year t ∈ [2005, 2010]; (c) the firm had no other
owners 2001-2014 who died in the year of or immediately after being an owner; and (d) the
firm had at least $100,000 in sales in at least one year in [t−4, t−1], the firm had positive
sales in all years [t−4, t−1], and the firm had positive employment in some year [t−4, t−1].33
We then match each such owner-death firm-owner-t observation to all “counterfactual”
firm-owner-t observations that satisfy the following criteria: (a) the firm never had an owner
die in the year of or immediately after being an owner; (b) the firm had at least $100,000
in sales in 2014 dollars during at least one year in [t−4, t−1], the firm had positive sales
in all years [t−4, t−1], and the firm had positive employment in some year [t−4, t−1]; and
(c) the observation matches the owner-death observation along four dimensions. Those four
dimensions are: the owners were in the same five-year age bin in year t, the owners were in
the same income fractile (99th to 99.5th percentile, 99.5th to 99.9th percentile, or top 0.1%)
in t−1, the firm had the same three-digit NAICS industry code, and the firm had the same
sales decile (defined after applying all other sample restrictions) in t−1.
The sample restrictions and matching procedure serve the following purposes. Restricting
to ages below 65 ensures that we examine owner deaths representative of typical owners (who
are working-age) rather than typical dying owners (who skew older). Restricting attention
to deaths in years 2005-2010 allows us to construct a balanced panel of firm observations
between four years before and four years after the death using our 2001-2014 data. Restrict-
ing to firms with substantial pre-period sales and positive employment focuses our analysis
on economically active firms. Matching on the various dimensions assists in identifying
counterfactual firms that would plausibly exhibit common trends to owner-death firms in
the absence of the owner death. The matching procedure is similar to other death-based
event studies (Jaravel, Petkova and Bell, 2015; Ja¨ger, 2016) except that it uses all matched
counterfactual observations rather than selecting one at random.34
33Most dying owners have a firm-owner observation in the year of death. We also include owner deaths
that occur one year after the last year the owner is in the main sample. Each firm-owner death is included
only once: a firm-owner’s year-t death observation is omitted when the owner died in t+1 and the firm-owner
has an observation in t+1.
34Using all matched counterfactual observations is akin to the reweighting procedure of DiNardo, Fortin
and Lemieux (1996) and increases precision when analyzing outcomes conditional on survival by both the
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After conducting the matches, we construct a balanced panel of firm outcomes for each
owner-death firm j and each counterfactual firm j′ for every year between four years before
and four years after the death. If the firm exits the sample (i.e., no longer files a Form 1120S
income tax return), the firm is coded as having zero sales and zero profits in exited years. We
discuss the interpretation of firm exits below. Our owner deaths analysis sample comprises
2,717,748 matched pair-year observations: nine years of observations on each of 2,509 owner-
death firms and 301,972 counterfactual firms. Our owner deaths analysis subsample of
top 0.1% owner deaths comprises 221,004 matched pair-year observations: nine years of
observations on each of 455 owner-death firms and 24,556 counterfactual firms. Appendix
Table A.5 provides a waterfall showing how sample restrictions produce our analysis sample.
We analyze two main outcomes: firm survival and profits per pre-period worker. Firm
survival in a year s equals an indicator for whether the firm has positive sales in s. Profits
per pre-period worker in a year s equals firm profits in s divided by the firm’s mean annual
workers across years [t−4, t−1] where t denotes the owner death year.
5.2 Event Study Estimates
We use our owner deaths analysis sample of matched owner-death and counterfactual firms
to estimate difference-in-differences impacts of owner deaths, as follows. Let j denote an
owner-death firm and j′ denote one of the counterfactual firms. For each matched pair-year
observation, we compute the difference in the outcome of interest between the owner-death
firm and the counterfactual firm in the given year, i.e., ∆Yjj′s ≡ Yjs − Yj′s. We then regress
that difference on event-time indicators in an event study specification:
∆Yjj′s =
∑
k∈{−4,−3,−2,0,1,2,3,4}
βkD
k
js + εjs (4)
where Dkjs is an indicator for owner-death firm j having experienced an owner death k years
in the past. The coefficients of interest βk provide the time path of mean owner-death firm
outcomes relative to the period before the owner death which is normalized to zero. Note
that because there are no controls, the coefficients βk are raw differences-in-differences of the
outcome means between owner-death firms and counterfactual firms between year t−1 and
other years. We ensure that each owner-death firm carries equal weight in the regression by
weighting each jj′s observation by one over the number of counterfactual (j′) firms matched
to the owner-death firm (j). We cluster standard errors by owner-death firm j.
Figure 5A plots point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from equation 4 estimated in
owner-death firm and the counterfactual firm (Table 4 columns 3 and 9 below).
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our top-1% owner deaths analysis sample for the outcome of firm survival. Plotted estimates
are mechanically zero prior to owner death because all firms survived until the death by
construction. The negative estimates after owner death imply that survival rates of owner
death firms relative to counterfactual firms decline immediately and persistently after the
owner death. The right-most data point is our focal estimate, also reported in Table 4A
column 1; the average top-1% owner death caused her firm to be 0.210 percentage points
less likely to have survived four years after the owner death, relative to counterfactual firms.
The effect size is precisely estimated, with a t-statistic of 21. Hence, we reject the rentier
hypothesis: firm owners are instrumental to firm performance.
We scale our regression estimates to compute a preferred percentage effect interpretation.
Table 4 column 1 reports that counterfactual firms had a four-year survival rate of 85.2%
and that the average dying owner owned 60.2% of the owner-death firm. We also estimate
that 28.6% of firm exits represent firm reorganizations rather than firm shutdowns.35 We
therefore interpret our 0.210-percentage-point point estimate as implying that the death of
a 100% owner causes firm survival to fall by 29.3% (= .210× (1− .286)/.852/.602).
Figure 5B presents results for profits per pre-period worker. Unlike Figure 5A, the
pre-period estimates are not mechanically zero. The flat pre-period trend corroborates the
common trends assumption underlying our difference-in-differences analysis—that in the
absence of the owner death, profits per pre-period worker among owner-death firms and
among counterfactual firms would have trended similarly. Profits per pre-period worker
decline immediately and persistently at owner-death firms relative to counterfactual firms
upon owner death. The rightmost data point, also reported in Table 4A column 2, indicates
that the mean top-1% owner death caused a $12,307 decline in profits per pre-period worker
four years after the owner death. The effect is precisely estimated, with a t-statistic of 6.
Given the counterfactual firms’ t+4 mean of $24,015 and the preceding paragraph’s logic,
we interpret our estimate as implying that the death of a 100% owner caused firm profits to
decline by 60.7%.
The larger percentage impact of owner deaths on profits than on survival suggests that the
profit impact occurs on both the extensive (firm survival) and intensive (firm performance)
35Some firm exits are not shutdowns: the firm reorganizes under a different employer identification number
either through bankruptcy or sale. We do not directly observe firm reorganizations, so we infer reorgani-
zations by whether most of the exiting firm’s workers subsequently appear as coworkers at another firm.
Specifically, for every owner-death firm that had zero sales in year t+4 and denoting its first year of zero
sales (i.e., its first fully exited year) by s, we identify the largest single employer other than the owner-death
firm across years s and s+1 of the firm’s s−1 workers excluding the dying owner. 28.6% of exiting firms
with at least two s−1 workers were reorganizations, in which the largest single employer following the owner
death employed over half of the owner-death firm’s s−1 workers. We do not adjust for counterfactual firms’
reorganizations, making our estimates conservative.
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margins. Table 4A column 3 tests for intensive margin effects by restricting the analysis
to pairs of owner-death firms and counterfactual firms that survived four years after the
owner death. We find in this subsample that the average owner death caused firm profits
to decline by $5,090 four years after the owner death. After scaling this estimate by the
outcome mean and ownership share, our preferred percentage impact of −39.6% suggests
that approximately two-thirds of the profit impact of owner deaths is along the intensive
margin.
Columns 4-6 report heterogeneity and placebo estimates that corroborate our rejection
of the rentier hypothesis. First, one might expect majority owners to be more likely to
actively manage their firms than minority owners and therefore that a majority owner death
causes a larger decline in firm profits than a minority owner death. Columns 4-5 test this
prediction by repeating column 2 on the subset of owner-death firms with dying minority
owners (those with less than or exactly 50% ownership) and firms with dying majority
owners (all others), respectively. We find that a majority owner death causes over three
times the profit decline than a minority owner death. When scaled by ownership shares,
the implied percentage impacts are statistically indistinguishable. Second, the non-elderly
owners analyzed in columns 1-5 are more likely to be active managers than elderly owners.
Column 6 implements a placebo test by repeating column 2 in an identically constructed
sample of matched owner-death firms that is based on owners who died at age 75 or greater.
We find no statistically significant impact of an elderly owner death on firm profits.
We can use additional owner death estimates on sales and employment to estimate αE,
the parameter that governs the importance of owner effort for firm performance. Appendix
B.3 shows that, under our modeling assumptions, αˆE =
βˆSales,E−(1−sowner)βˆL,E
(1+ 1η )
where βˆSales,E
and βˆSales,E are the elasticity of sales and employment with respect to owner effort, sowner is
the owner share of payments, and η is the product demand elasticity.36 Thus, we estimate
αˆE =
.30−(1−.45).24
1− 1
4.5
≈ .22.
The preceding analyses considered firms with dying top 1% owners, including top 0.1%
owners. Figures 5C-D and Table 4B repeat the analysis on the 461 owner-death firms with a
dying top-0.1% owner. Regression results are qualitatively similar, and preferred percentage
estimates are quantitatively similar as well.
These findings contribute to a literature on the effect of managers and CEOs on firm per-
formance using research designs based on retirements, family succession, and CEO deaths.
Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan and Newman (1985), Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006), and Bennedsen,
36The values and sources for each parameter estimates are described in Appendix B.3. These values result
in an average estimate for αE that can vary substantially across firms due to heterogeneity in the impacts
on firm performance, owner shares, and product demand elasticities.
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Nielsen, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Wolfenzon (2007) find that, when replacing an outgoing CEO,
choosing an external CEO increases firm value and performance relative to choosing a within-
family CEO. In Danish administrative data, Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon
(2010) and Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2011) use CEO deaths and hospi-
talizations, respectively, to show that these events cause significant declines in profitability,
with larger effects for CEOs who are younger and more likely to be actively involved in the
firm’s operations. The estimates from our owner death design are considerably larger than
estimates from these studies, which find average effects of professional CEOs between 10 and
25 percent in terms of operating profitability. This fact underscores the central importance
of active owner-managers in our setting.37
6 High and Rising Firm Profitability
We now explore whether capital accumulation or superior profitability is driving top incomes
and their rise. Under the rentier view, top owners earn high business income purely because
of scale: all firms are equally profitable, and high earners have accumulated large business
holdings. However, if owner talent is an important input to production, then owners may
earn high business income because their firms generate superior profitability, possibly in
addition to being larger. Moreover, if the supply of effort from skilled owner-managers
becomes increasingly costly, we should find that rising profitability contributes to rising
profits at top-owned firms.
We find that firms owned by individuals in the top 1% and top 0.1% generate very high
profitability that has grown over time. In contrast, the scale of top-owned firms has not
risen. A decomposition shows that rising profitability rather than rising scale explains most
of the rise in top S-corporation income. Neither risk nor assortative matching of high-earners
to highly profitable firms explains the results. We also show that rising pass-through income
is a largely real rather than reporting phenomenon.
6.1 High Profitability
To test whether top-owned firms generate especially high profitability, we begin by binning
year-2014 owners in the main sample by their personal income rank in the overall U.S.
income distribution. We confine attention to the top personal income decile, where the vast
majority of S-corporation income accrues. The bins are one-percentile wide, except in the
37Consistent with our findings, Ja¨ger (2016) uses German data to show that manager deaths cause a
decline of average yearly wages among incumbent workers of approximately 1%. However, his paper does
not estimate effects on firm performance.
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top 1% where we consider bins between the 99th percentile and 99.5th percentile, the 99.5th
percentile and 99.9th percentile, and the top 0.1%.
We then compute mean profitability—measured as profits per worker—across firms owned
by individuals within each personal income bin, with and without controls, as follows. When
not using controls, we compute the mean profitability across owner-firm observations within
each bin weighting by firm scale (the number of workers).38 Our main specification controls
for industry (four-digit NAICS) by removing profitability variation across owner income bins
that is correlated with industry fixed effects.39 We similarly execute a specification in which
we control for interactions of industry fixed effects and firm size ventiles (five-percentile-point
bins of firm sales).
Figure 6A plots the results. The series in red squares is our preferred specification,
which plots mean profitability net of industry fixed effects. If profitability did not vary
systematically by owner income, the series would be flat. Instead, the series is highly convex.
Firms owned by top 0.1% earners enjoy profitability ($16K per worker) that is over twice as
large as the profitability ($7.5K per worker) of firms owned by individuals in the bottom half
of the top decile. The graph displays similar patterns without controls and when controlling
additionally for firm size.
Panel A’s convex profitability-income gradient implies that top owners do not earn high
business income solely because their firms operate at larger scale. Instead, their firms gener-
ate superior profits per unit of scale. Figure 6B demonstrates that high firm profitability is a
persistent and systematic characteristic of high earners. It replicates Panel A in the subsam-
ple of startups, plotting the profitability-income gradient using owner income ranks from the
year before the owner founded the startup. A firm qualifies as a startup in year t if it filed
an S-corporation income tax return in year t and did not file a business income tax return
of any kind before year t. We find all such owner-startup observations in the main sample
in years 2001-2010 and define the owner’s income rank using her personal income in the
year before she founded the startup. Then for each startup year, we produce a profitability-
income gradient net of industry fixed effects, using profitability from the startup’s fifth year
of existence and conditioning on startups that survive for at least five years. We then average
38We focus on firms with positive workers. We winsorize profitability at the 1st and 99th percentiles across
the year’s top-decile owner-firm observations. We do not apportion profits and workers to owners according
to ownership shares. Results are similar when apportioning (Appendix Figure A.6).
39Specifically, we compute profitability at the owner-firm level for all owners in the top personal income
decile, regress profitability on industry fixed effects weighted by the number of workers, compute residuals,
add a constant to the residuals such that the sum of the product of the residuals and the number of
workers equals total profits, and then compute the employment-weighted mean of each bin’s residuals. The
addition of the constant ensures that the overall employment-weighted mean profitability is constant across
specifications.
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those gradients evenly across years and plot the mean gradient in circles in Panel B.
Startups founded by top earners go on to be much more profitable in their fifth year than
those started by other lower earners.40 The panel also shows that we find similar results
when including all startups regardless of how long they survive, computing each startup’s
profitability as total profits in the startup’s first five years divided by total annual workers in
the startup’s first five years. Hence, superior firm profitability is a persistent and systematic
characteristic of high earners. Not only does this reject the accumulation view, but it also
has important implications for wealth estimates—uniform return assumptions may overstate
wealth estimates at the top of the income distribution.
6.2 Rising Profitability, Not Rising Scale
We now turn to investigating the relative importance of rising profitability versus rising scale
for explaining the rise in top business income. We first separately analyze the time series of
profitability and scale. Then, we quantify their relative contributions to rising top business
income.
Figure 6C analyzes the profitability of top-owned firms in the time series. We construct
annual versions of the profitability-income gradient of Figure 6A and plot two quantities:
mean profitability among top-0.1%-owned firms and the profitability of firms owned by the
individuals in the 90th-95th percentiles over time 2001-2014. The figure shows that top-
owned firms have doubled in profitability, from $8K per worker in 2001 to $16K in 2014.
Moreover, the graph shows that the profitability of P90-P95-owned firms rose much less.
Thus, top owners generate superior profitability that has risen dramatically over time.
To investigate how much top-owned firm scale has also risen over time, Figure 7 plots
two measures of the distribution of S-corporation activity across firms of different scale. We
measure scale as the firm’s number of workers and plot distributions in three years: 2001,
2007, and 2014. Panel A plots the share of workers across four scale bins: firms with fewer
than 10 workers, firms with 10-50 workers, firms with 51-100 workers, and firms with over
100 workers. The share of workers at firms with over 100 workers has fallen slightly over
time from 57% in 2001 to 50% in 2014. Panel B shows a similar pattern for the distribution
of firm profits across the four scale bins. Thus, firm profitability has risen over time, while
scale has not.
Panels A and B of Figure 8 summarize the lessons of this subsection and the previous
subsection by plotting how S-corporation profitability and scale has evolved since 2001, by
owner income groups. Panel A plots aggregate profits per worker for three different types of
40Note that these firms have existed for only five years, so the magnitude of performance advantages may
differ relative to the full sample of top-owned firms for firm life-cycle reasons.
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S-corporations: those with a top 0.1% owner, those with an owner in the top 1-0.1%, and
those without a top owner. Top-owned firms exhibited high and rising profitability. Panel B
shows firm scale (the number of workers) rather than profits per worker. Similar to Panel A’s
profitability patterns, top-owned firms are larger than other firms in the cross-section: they
employed roughly 125 more workers than non-top-owned firms on average in 2001. But unlike
Panel A’s profitability patterns, top-owned firms shrunk on average between 2001-2014. The
scale difference between top-owned firms and non-top-owned firms also fell between 2001-
2014. Together, these facts indicate that rising profitability rather than rising scale explains
the rise in top S-corporation income.
To quantify the degree to which rising profitability rather than rising scale explains rising
top S-corporation income, Figures 8C and 8D decompose the growth of S-corporation profits
for top-1-0.1%- and top-0.1%-owned firms, respectively. The graphs show how profitability
and components of scale evolved relative to their 2001 levels. Specifically, we plot the
following components:
pit
pi01︸︷︷︸
Profit Growth
=
pit/Lt
pi01/L01︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profitability Growth
× Lt/Ownert
L01/Owner01
× Ownert/F irmt
Owner01/F irm01
× Firmst
Firms01︸ ︷︷ ︸
Scale Growth
(5)
where growth is defined as the ratio of the current value (denoted by t) to the value in
2001 (denoted by 01), profit pi is aggregate S-corporation profits for a given set of firms,
profitability is the ratio of profits to scale (the number of workers), and scale can be decom-
posed further as the product of three terms: the number of workers per owner, the number
of owners per firm, and the number of firms. Panels C and D show that for top-owned
firms, aggregate profits doubled since 2001. Profitability also nearly doubled for top-owned
firms, while scale and each of its subcomponents did not increase since 2001, except a mod-
est increase in the number of firms. This decomposition illustrates that rising profitability
explains nearly all of the growth in top S-corporation profits.
Table 5 reports the precise results of our decomposition for 2001-2014, both overall and
across sector. The table has three panels: all owners in A, top-1-0.1%-owned firms in B, and
top-0.1%-owned firms in C. Profit growth was broad-based across industries and the largest
growth overall was in healthcare and information and professional services. Profitability
growth was also broad-based, with profitability increases of over 40% in every sector, and the
largest increase in manufacturing. Profitability increases coincided in many cases with reduc-
tions in workers per firm and owners per firm. The number of firms increased generally and
especially in healthcare. Overall, profitability growth accounts for 73.4% (= 84.48/115.10)
and 87.7% (= 81.69/93.16) of the growth in top-1-0.1% and top 0.1% S-corporation profits,
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respectively.
6.3 Not Risk or Rising Assortativeness
This subsection tests two alternative explanations for high and rising profitability at top-
owned firms. The first potential explanation is undiversifiable risk, which is a common
explanation for high profitability. For example, if top-owned firms have a higher probability
of failure, owners could be compensated for that risk by higher profitability in years of
survival. The blue circles (left axis) in Figure 9A plot the share of year-2001 firms in the
main sample that had exited the sample by 2014 (which typically indicates failure) versus
2001 owner personal income rank, weighting by the firm’s 2001 number of workers. Rather
than experiencing higher exit rates than average, top-owned firms experienced lower exit
rates than average. This finding suggests that top-owned firms exhibit higher profitability
and lower risk.
Whereas the exit rate measure proxies for risk along the extensive margin of firm exit,
we employ a second measure that proxies for risk: a version of the Sharpe ratio, computed
within each personal income bin. The Sharpe ratio—typically defined as an asset’s mean
return divided by the standard deviation of its returns—is commonly used in finance to
assess whether an asset’s return compensates for its risk. A high Sharpe ratio indicates
returns in excess of what one would expect given the risk. In our context, higher Sharpe
ratios among top-owned firms would indicate that top-owned firms’ high profitability more
than sufficiently compensates their owners for their risk. For each year 2011-2014 in the main
sample, we compute each personal income bin’s Sharpe ratio as the ratio of employment-
weighted mean profitability to the employment-weighted standard deviation of profitability
across owner-firm observations. We then average those within-bin Sharpe ratios evenly across
years and plot the means in the green triangles (right axis) of Figure 9A. Top income bins
have higher standard deviations of profitability, indicating somewhat higher risk. However,
profitability is so much higher in top income bins that we find higher Sharpe ratios among
top-owned firms. This finding suggests that higher risk does not explain higher profitability
among top-owned firms.
Turning to the time series, we further use the Sharpe ratio to test whether rising risk
among top-owned firms explains rising top-owned firms’ profitability. In Figure 9A, we
plot a 2001-2004 version of the 2011-2014 Sharpe ratio curve defined above. If rising risk
explained rising top-owned-firms’ profitability, we would expect the top bins’ 2011-2014
Sharpe ratio values to lie below their 2001-2014 values. Instead, the 2011-2014 values lie
above the 2001-2014 values: top-owned firms in 2011-2014 appear to have enjoyed higher
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profitability without commensurately higher risk. Hence, we do not find evidence that higher
risk explains higher profitability among top-owned firms—neither in the cross section nor in
the time series.
Finally, we consider a second explanation for rising profitability at top-owned firms:
ownership reallocation such that top owners are increasingly assortatively matched with
highly profitable firms. Under this explanation, the distribution of firm profitability has
not changed; all that has changed is the mean income rank of the owners at the most
profitable firms. We test this possibility by ranking firms in the main sample according
to their profitability in each year. We then plot in Figure 9B the mean firm profitability
rank for different top-owner groups: the top 0.1%, top 0.1-top 0.5%, top 1%-top 0.5%, and
top 2%. The graph shows that top owners tend to own higher ranked firms. However, the
average rank is quite stable over time.
The stability in the allocation of top firm ownership found in Panel B implies that diverg-
ing firm performance explains rising profitability among top-owned firms. Panel C illustrates
this fact directly. It plots percentiles of the S-corporation profitability distribution for each
year 2001-2014. The graph shows that the firm-level profitability distribution widened at the
top. While the 25th percentile and median profitability across each year’s S-corporations
has been relatively stable, the 75th percentile and especially the 95th percentile have in-
creased. Thus, diverging firm profitability rather than a rising assortative matching of the
most-profitable firms to high-income individuals accounts for the rising profitability enjoyed
by top owners.
To sum up, this section has shown that high and rising profitability among top-owned
firms explains the vast majority of rising top S-corporation income in the twenty-first century.
The high and rising profitability enjoyed by top owners is not explained by high or rising
risk but reflects high and rising profitability of the most profitable firms.
6.4 Not a Reporting Phenomenon
When business income is earned in C-corporation form, corporate income taxes never appear
on personal income tax returns and retained earnings do not appear in the year the income is
earned and may never appear. The rising top S-corporation income documented in Section
1 could therefore reflect relabeling of business income, as businesses reorganized from C-
corporation form to S-corporation form and entrants increasingly chose S-corporation form.
We now demonstrate that most of the rise in top S-corporation income is in fact a real
economic phenomenon.
Figure 10A uses SOI aggregate statistics to highlight the possibility that the rising top
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S-corporation income documented in Figure 1C does not represent a real rise in business
income. We plot the S-corporation share of three measures of total (C+S+P) corporate and
partnership activity: the total number of firms, total profits, and total sales. After the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 changed the incentives to organize business activity as an S-corporation,
the S-corporation share of the number of total corporate firms and partnerships rose from
16% to 47% in 2012. Similarly, the S-corporation share of total corporate and partnership
profits rose from 4% to 20%, and the S-corporation share of total corporate and partnership
sales rose from 5% to 19%. The rising S-corporation share of total corporate and partnership
profits indicates that some share of rising top S-corporation income is an artifact of changes
in the organizational form through which business income is reported. However, Figure 10B
shows this rapid increase in the number of S-corporations is due to S-corporations that are
not owned by top earners. For instance, the number of S-corporations that have top 0.1%
owners was actually slightly lower in 2010-2014 (roughly 135 thousand S-corporations) than
it was in the early-to-mid 2000s (roughly 140 thousand S-corporations).
To assess the reporting concern more directly, we collect data from the population of
businesses that switch corporate forms between 2001 and 2014. On average, approximately
sixty-seven thousand C-corporations switch each year, corresponding to between 3 and 5
percent of total potential C-corporations. To evaluate the importance of these switchers for
the aggregate growth of S-corporation profits, consider the decomposition
∆Y1 ≡ ∆Y0 + [∆Y1 −∆Y0] = ∆Y0 + ∆Z, (6)
where Y1 is total S-corporation profits, Y0 is counterfactual S-corporation profits without
any switchers, and Z refers to S-corporation profits not driven by organic factors. We
measure ∆Z by cumulating profits earned by all switchers between 2001 and 2014. This
figure amounts to $70.5B, or 30% of the total growth in S-corporation profits of $235.2B.
Thus, 70% of the growth in S-corporation profits is due to firms that did not switch from
C-corporation form during this time. However, this calculation neglects the role of organic
entry and exit. If changes in the propensity to enter or exit as an S-corporation have led to
a differential increase in the share of total activity in S-corporation form, this could account
for some share of ∆Z not captured by our switchers analysis.
To explore this concern, Figure 10C decomposes the level of S-corporation profits between
2001 and 2014 into actual S-corporation profits and the share attributed to organizational
form changes. To correct for the effect of differential net entry into the S-corporation sec-
tor, the decomposition assumes the level of S-corporation sales remains a constant share
of total business sales (including S-corporations, C-corporations, and partnerships) for each
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4-digit NAICS industry throughout the time period. The top bars represent the share of
S-corporation profits that are due to S-corporations having a higher share of total business
sales relative to 2001. Figure 10D applies the same transformation to decompose the growth
in S-corporation profits among those with top 0.1% owners.
Figure 10C shows that in 2014, the share of profit levels due to organizational form
changes was approximately 15%, while 85% of S-corporation profits remain under the con-
stant share assumption. In terms of growth, Figure 10D shows that actual top profits doubled
between 2001 and 2014 in real terms, while counterfactual profits rose roughly 75%. Thus,
most of the growth in top profits remains after adjusting for corporate form reorganization.
6.5 Discussion of Retained Earnings
Our analysis considers all directly observed income reported on personal income tax returns,
excluding realized capital gains and transfer payments. A substantial share of national
capital income does not appear on personal income tax returns (Piketty, Saez and Zucman,
2018). The key omitted component of national capital income is the retained earnings of
C-corporations (i.e., earnings not distributed as dividends). Imputations of retained earnings
can affect the magnitude of top income growth and its composition (Clarke and Kopczuk,
2017; Auten and Splinter, 2016), including due to re-ranking of which individuals are in the
top 1% (Piketty, Saez and Zucman, 2018). Given the fact that retained earnings are not
directly observed, there is inherently more uncertainty about the distribution of retained
earnings.
We conjecture that including the true distribution of retained earnings would not overturn
the conclusion that the working-rich remain quantitatively important at the top of the income
distribution. First, the vast majority of top earners in our data—in 2014, 88.0% of the top 1%
and 89.0% of the top 0.1%—earn most of their income in the form of pass-through income
or wage-and-salary income, strengthening our conclusions based on pass-through income
alone.41 Second, and like pass-through income, some retained earnings are likely disguised
labor income, for example, from the active management of companies by private equity
partners that realize some income in the form of “carried interest” capital gains.42 Third,
plausible distributions of retained earnings could have a limited impact on whether the typical
top-earner earns most of her income through labor or the importance of pass-through income
41These shares are nearly equal because the pass-through share of income rises with income rank approx-
imately as much as the wage-and-salary share of income falls with income rank. When including realized
capital gains in defining the income and percentile thresholds, the shares are 77.7% and 66.0%, respectively.
42Startups are also reported to routinely issue stock and options to executives at below-market prices,
allowing executives to accrue labor income in the form of lightly taxed retained earnings.
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for aggregate top income growth.43 Last, many top earners with majority-passive income
are self-made individuals who accumulated their wealth by saving their entrepreneurial labor
income and who continue to work—typified by founders of successful new ventures who still
manage those or similar firms (Kaplan and Rauh, 2013a)—such that many majority-passive
earners are not retired and are still working. Promising avenues for future research include
investigating the life-cycle dynamics of entrepreneurship and collecting data that link C-
corporations to their owners, building on what we have done here for S-corporations and
partnerships.
7 Implications of Disguised Wages
Our evidence has suggested that top business income does not simply derive from passive
returns to accumulated capital. Instead, a large share of top earners derive private business
income as active owner-managers, which implies that some portion of top private business
income is wage income in disguise. We close our analysis by quantifying two implications of
this finding.
7.1 Disguised Wages and the Corporate Sector Labor Share
Our paper has found in the universe of S-corporations that a large share of business profits
derive from the active participation of owner-managers. Owner-managers have leeway in
whether they report their income for tax purposes as wages or as profits. C-corporation
owner-managers face tax incentives to report their income as wages while S-corporation
owner-managers face tax incentives to report it as profits. We show in this subsection that
this fact substantially affects the measurement of changes in the U.S. corporate sector labor
share. The U.S. corporate sector comprises C-corporations and S-corporations. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 made S form tax superior to C form for eligible firms. Ever since,
the share of business activity in S form has risen while the share in C form has fallen.
43Estimates of U.S. public stock ownership suggest that public stock accounts for most of the rise in
U.S. retained earnings, a substantial share of which is owned by pension funds, in retirement accounts,
and by foreigners (Rosenthal and Austin, 2016). For the share held by individuals, the top 1% in terms of
wealth own 38% of stocks, including stocks held indirectly through retirement accounts, according to the
2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (Wolff, 2016). Taxable dividends paid to top-1% earners amount to just
20% of total taxable dividends in recent years, and just 5% of retirement account distributions were paid
to top 1% individuals—though these income shares would change if retained earnings were used to re-rank
individuals (Piketty, Saez and Zucman, 2018). In addition, for any given level of retained earnings accruing
to the top-1%, top-1% retained earnings may be quite concentrated among a small number of top earners
such as Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg, which would indicate that the typical top earner is working-rich
regardless of how much retained earnings accrue to the top few people.
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This transformation of C-corporation activity into S-corporation mechanically reduces the
measured labor share, given owner-managers’ incentives to report their income as profits
rather than wages under S form.
We use a sample of firms that switch from C-corporation to S-corporation form to study
the role of corporate form changes for trends in the aggregate labor share in the U.S. Figure
11 presents evidence that a nontrivial share of S-corporation profits would have been reported
as labor payments if the firms organized as C-corporations. To show this, we plot average
labor payments (including officer compensation) and profits relative to contemporaneous
firm sales, conditional on firm and calendar year fixed effects, for a sample of 259,957 S-
corporations that switched from C-corporation form to S-corporation form between 2001
and 2014. The sample includes firms that are of non-trivial size and present for at least 4
years prior to the switch event.
Figure 11A plots the impacts on profits and labor payments for all firms. On average,
labor payments fall sharply in the event year by 1.95% on average relative to sales, which are
offset by a profit margin that increases by 1.76% on average. The substition of wages to prof-
its around switching provides further evidence of active participation among S-corporation
owners. This behavior is difficult to arrange for firms where owners and top managers are
separate, because the firm would be underpaying and overpaying different people.
Figures 11B-D present subsample analyses. Panel B shows that offices of physicians and
dentists, which are closely held with relatively few workers, display much larger responses
than the full sample. For this group, profit margins increase 7.81% and labor payments fall
6.36% relative to sales following a switch. Panel C shows that when large firms (i.e., with
mean sales > $50M) switch, approximately zero relabeling occurs. Panel D shows that small
firms that switch (i.e., with mean sales < $5M) show similar patterns to the full sample.
This result reflects, in part, the fact that these firms account for 85% of the sample.
How much would the corporate sector labor share have declined if all corporations were C-
corporations? To answer this question, we combine labor share data from Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2014), aggregate S-corporation sales going back to 1980 from SOI, and our estimate
of the effect of organizing as an S-corporation on reported labor compensation relative to
sales (1.95% of sales). Figure 12A displays our results. In 2012, the last year for which labor
share data are provided by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), our estimate implies that
roughly $116B of aggregate S-corporation profits are disguised wages. Thus, we estimate
that the aggregate labor share is understated by 1.4 percentage points. Since 1980 the labor
share in the U.S. corporate sector fell 7.5 percentage points from 64.7% to 57.2%. Our
counterfactual series shows a decline of 6.3 percentage points, 16% smaller than in the raw
data. This finding shows that the fact that owners actively generate their business income
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meaningfully affects economic measurement of different components of national income, in
the real-world environment of changing tax policy.44
7.2 Disguised Wages and Tax Policy
A simple tax implication of our results is that, under current law, the federal marginal tax
rate on labor income falls at the top of the income distribution. As explained in Section
2.1, wage income is subject to both the federal ordinary income tax (39.6% at the top) and
additional federal labor income taxes (the 2.9% employee and employer Medicare taxes and
the 0.9% Affordable Care Act Additional Medicare Tax on labor income), while active S-
corporation income is subject only to the personal income tax.45 Our analysis of the profit
impact of an owner death yielded an estimate of 61% of the share of S-corporation profits.
In this subsection’s exercise, we will interpret that finding as showing that 61% of top S-
corporation income is wage income in disguise. We apply these parameters to the 2014 SOI
personal income tax sample in order to estimate the effective federal marginal tax rate on
labor income at various points in the personal (i.e. labor plus other) income distribution.
We define labor income as Form 1040 Wages, Salaries, and Tips (explicit wages) plus the
disguised wages share of active S-corporation income.46
We find that the effective marginal tax rate on labor income rises as one’s personal income
breaches the top ordinary income tax bracket (above $457,601 for married-filing-jointly tax
units and somewhat less for other units). However, disguised wages constitute a larger share
of labor income among very-high-income tax units than among lower-income units. As a
result, we find that the effective federal marginal tax rate on labor income falls at the very
top of the income distribution.47 From a positive perspective, the results suggest that high-
44The overstatement of corporate profits and understatement of wages is also important for government es-
timates of the projected shortfall for payroll-tax-funded programs, such as Social Security and Medicare. See
Congressional testimony by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/
51988) and the Social Security Administration (SSA, https://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_
092116.html) for more detail.
45None of the Affordable Care Act’s surtaxes applied to active S-corporation income.
46For tax units with both explicit wages and disguised wages, we compute the tax unit’s marginal tax
rate on labor income as the weighted average between its marginal tax rate on explicit wages and its tax
rate on disguised wages, with weights equal to their respective shares of labor income. The marginal top tax
rate on explicit wages equals 43.4%. The marginal top tax rate on disguised wages equals 39.6%. Tax units
subject to the alternative minimum tax are assigned a marginal income tax rate equal to the maximum of
their marginal ordinary income tax rate and their marginal alternative minimum tax rate.
47Appendix figure A.11 plots the effective marginal tax rate by broad income group within the top tax
bracket. Tax units with personal income between $1 million and $50 million face a 42.8% tax rate on their
marginal dollar of labor income. That marginal tax rate falls as personal income rises above $50 million, down
to 42.0% among tax units with over $100 million in personal income. Though the decline in the marginal
labor income tax rate is small in absolute magnitude, its negative direction contrasts with normative tax
prescriptions for rising or flat top labor income tax rates (Diamond, 1998; Saez, 2001) and the apparent
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earners’ relative ability to earn wage income in the form of S-corporation income allows them
to enjoy lower taxes than those less well off.
8 Conclusion
This paper uses administrative income tax data linking 11 million firms to their owners to
find that private business owners who actively manage their firms are key for top income
inequality. The majority of top earners receive some private business income—most of
which accrues to active owner-managers of mid-market firms in relatively skill-intensive and
unconcentrated industries. Top-owned firms’ profits fall substantially after a premature
owner death. Top-owned firms are twice as profitable as other firms despite similar risk, and
rising profitability at top-owned firms explains most of the rise in top profits. Taken together,
this evidence rejects the hypothesis that high and rising top business income reflects passive
returns to high and rising capital accumulation. Instead, the working rich remain central to
rising top incomes in the twenty-first century.
We highlight six implications:
First, much of rising top income inequality remains consistent with rising returns to
top skill, though we stress that our findings are silent on the social value of those returns.
In particular, the returns to owner-manager skill can include returns to rent-seeking, elite
connections, and unequal access to the opportunity to enter certain professions, industries,
or markets.
Second, firm-level variation in profitability amplifies top income inequality, with firm
ownership being a key channel through which firms matter for inequality. The role of owners
for firm profitability may also play a role in accounting for persistent dispersion in firm
productivity.
Third, wage earnings data likely understate the returns to education and skill at the top
of the income distribution, because wage data miss a significant share of income derived from
operating a business.
Fourth, top wealth estimates based on capitalized income flows and a constant returns
assumption can be improved by accounting for the higher profitability of top-owned firms.
Fifth, conventional measures overstate the decline in the U.S. labor share as well as
marginal tax rates on top labor income. As a result of differences in the treatment of
wages and active business income, the tax code currently features quantitatively meaningful
horizontal inequities as well as regressivity at the top of the income distribution, which distort
the reporting of taxable income. Nevertheless, our estimate that 25-30% of the growth of
desire for rising or flat top labor income tax rates embodied in the graduated personal income tax.
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S-corporation profits reflects changes in the reporting of business income implies that most
of the growth in top profits is real.
Sixth, estimates of the elasticity of business income and real activity with respect to
“capital” taxes likely reflect a mix of capital and labor elasticities. Our results underscore the
importance of the rise of private pass-through businesses, the mixed nature of pass-through
income, and the potential value of a harmonized business tax system for the twenty-first
century.
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Figure 1: Rising U.S. Income Inequality and Business Income
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A (see Section 2.4) to decompose the top 1% income share into two components: labor income (i.e. wages,
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Figure 2: Most of Top 1% and 0.1% Earn Pass-Through Income
A. Top 1% Pass-Through Ownership B. Top 0.1% Pass-Through Ownership
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
(
%
)
Top 1% Taxpayers Share of Pass-Through Owners
57.4%
947,000
7.5%
9.1%
30.2%
53.2%
Firm Sales
>$500m
$50m -
$500m
$5m -
$50m
<$5m
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
(
%
)
Top 0.1% Taxpayers Share of Pass-Through Owners
78.8%
130,000
14.3%
21.4%
39.7%
24.7%
Firm Sales
>$500m
$50m -
$500m
$5m -
$50m
<$5m
C. Pass-Through Income of Top 1% Owners D. Pass-Through Income of Top 0.1% Owners
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
(
%
)
Personal Income of Top 1% Owners Pass-Through Income of Top 1% Owners
48.3%
$474B
22.2%
27.7%
36.1%
14.1%
Firm Sales
>$500m
$50m -
$500m
$5m -
$50m
<$5m
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
(
%
)
Personal Income of Top 0.1% Owners Pass-Through Income of Top 0.1% Owners
46.0%
$264B
28.8%
36.0%
31.3%
3.9%
Firm Sales
>$500m
$50m -
$500m
$5m -
$50m
<$5m
Notes: Panel A plots for 2014 the share of the top 1% with pass-through income, and breaks down pass-through owners’ share of total sales by sales
bin. Similar to Panel A, Panel B plots the share of top 0.1% with pass-through income and top 0.1% sales by sales bin. Panel C plots pass-through
income share for top 1% pass-through owners, and graphs share of top 1%-owned pass-through income by total sales. Panel D replicates Panel C for
top 0.1% owned pass-throughs. Overall, 947,000 and 130,000 taxpayers collectively earn $474B and $264B in the top 1% and top 0.1%, respectively.
45
Figure 3: S-Corporations Are Actively Held, Mid-Market, and Broad-Based Across Geography and Industry
A. Share of Owners by Age Group B. Firm Size Distribution
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Figure 4: Correlates of S-Corporation Profits across Industries
A. Top 1% Profits
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B. Top 0.1% Profits
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Notes to Figure 4: This figure presents correlations and robust 95% confidence intervals among firms owned
by the top 1% in Panel A and top 0.1% in Panel B for total profits and several industry-level characteristics,
defined below. Top profits are the 2014 level of profits in 2014 dollars among firms with top 1% or top
0.1% owners. Skill share of workers is the 2000-2014 average share of workers in a 4-digit industry who
have at least some college in the CPS. Top average wages is total 2014 wages among top-owned firms
divided by top-owned firms’ 2014 number of W-2 payees. Officer share of wages is the share of labor
compensation (the sum of salaries and wages paid to employees, employee benefit programs such as health
insurance, and contributions to pension and profit-sharing plans) that accrues to officers. Specifically, on
Form 1120S it is line 7 divided by the sum of lines 7, 8, 17, and 18. Share using a computer is the share
of 2000-2014 average share of workers who use a computer as part of their role, following Autor, Levy and
Murnane (2003). Concentration is the sales Herfindahl in each 4-digit industry, including both C- and
S-corporations, averaged over the years 2000-2014. Top workers per firm is the number of W-2 payees in
top-owned firms in 2014 divided by the number of top-owned firms in 2014. Capital per worker is total
book value of depreciable assets less accumulated depreciation divided by aggregate W-2 payees. Capital is
measured as the average for all S-corporations in the IRS SOI corporate sample betweeen 2000 and 2014,
weighted to represent the population. Aggregate W-2 payees is measured directly for the population of
S-corporations. R&D and advertising are the industry’s average share of total R&D expenditures and
total advertising expenditure in Compustat between 2000 and 2014. International profits is the 2000-2014
average of total foreign net income reported by S-corporations on Schedule M3 of their tax return divided
by the 2000-2014 average of total S-corporation profits. All variables are standardized.
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Figure 5: Impact of Top 1% and Top 0.1% Owner Death on Firm Performance
A. Firm Survival of Top 1% Owned B. Profits per Worker of Top 1% Owned ($K)
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C. Firm Survival of Top 0.1% Owned D. Profits per Worker of Top 0.1% Owned ($K)
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Notes: This figure analyzes the impact of owner deaths on firm performance. We identify all 2,509 “owner-
death” firms that: (i) have an owner in a year t ∈ [2005, 2010] who was under age 65, died in year t, and
was a top-1% earner in t − 1; (ii) had no other owner deaths 2001-2014, at least $100,000 in sales in 2014
dollars in at least one year in [t− 4, t− 1], positive sales in all years [t− 4, t− 1], and the firm had positive
employment in some year [t − 4, t − 1]; and (iii) has at least one “counterfactual” firm that met the same
[t−4, t−1] firm requirements, match the owner-death firm on three-digit industry and t−1 sales decile, and
have a year-t owner who matches the dying owner on t − 1 income fractile and five-year age bin. We also
include owner deaths that occur one year after the last year the owner is in the main sample, when that last
year is in [2005, 2010] and all other criteria are satisfied. Panel A presents simple difference-in-differences
estimates of the impact of a year-t owner death on the owner death firm’s survival (having positive sales)
[t− 4, t+ 4], relative to t− 1 and to all matched counterfactual firms. Each owner-death firm carries equal
weight. See Section 5.2 for more details. Panel B repeats Panel A for the outcome of profits per pre-period
worker, equal to annual profits divided by the firm’s mean annual number of workers [t − 4, t − 1]. Firm
profits are set to zero for exited firms. Panels C and D repeat Panels A and B for the subset of owner-death
and counterfactual firms with a top-0.1% owner.
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Figure 6: Profitability Rises with Owner Income Rank
A. Profitability Increases with Owner Income Rank (All Firms)
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Notes: Panel A plots our main measure of profitability—profits ($K) per worker—by owner personal income
rank across owner-firm observations in the 2014 main sample. Owners are ranked by their positions in the
overall U.S. income distribution using the personal income concept of Piketty and Saez (2003). The bins
are one-percentile-point wide in personal income ranks, except in the top 1% where we consider bins of
ranks between the 99th percentile and 99.5th percentile, the 99.5th percentile and 99.9th percentile, and the
top 0.1%. Means are weighted by scale (the firm’s number of workers). Sales fixed effects denote ventiles
(five-percentile-point bins). See Appendix Figure A.6 for an alternative version that apportions profits and
workers to owners according to their ownership shares. Panel B plots the equivalent of Panel A’s within-
industry series using the population of S-corporation start-ups 2001-2010. It ranks owners by their personal
income in the year before founding their startups. It plots in blue circles profits per worker in the firm’s fifth
year of existence, conditional on the firm surviving five years. It plots in red squares the startup’s sum of
its first five years of annual profits divided by the startup’s sum of its first five years of annual number of
workers, imputing zeros for profits and workers in years after a startup exits. Panel C plots the time series
of Panel A’s within-industry top-0.1% data point and the analogous time series of the evenly weighted mean
of Panel A’s 90th-95th data points. Appendix Figure A.7 shows high and rising profitability is not driven
by differences in capital intensity across firms. See Section 6.1 for additional detail.
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Figure 7: Share of Economic Activity Has Not Been Increasing at Large Employers
A. Share of Workers by Firm Size
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Notes: This figure plots two measures of the distribution of S-corporation activity across firms of different
scale, using the main analysis sample. We measure scale as the firm’s number of workers (defined in this
graph as the firm’s number of W-2 recipients plus the firm’s number of 1099-MISC recipients with positive
independent contractor income) and plot distributions in three years: 2001, 2007, and 2014. Panel A plots
the share of workers across four scale bins: firms with fewer than 10 workers, firms with 10-50 workers, firms
with 51-100 workers, and firms with over 100 workers. Panel B plots the analogous distributions of firm
profits across the four scale bins in each of the three years.
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Figure 8: Rising Profitability Explains Most Top S-Corporation Income Growth
A. Profitability Differences are Diverging B. Firm Size Differences are Not
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Notes: Panel A plots aggregate profits per worker in thousands of dollars by year and owner type. Panel B
plots workers per firm by year and owner type. Panels C and D plot the time series of each component of our
decomposition of S-corporation profit growth: scale components (number of workers per owner, number of
owners per firm, and number of firms) and a profitability component (profits per worker). Panel C considers
firms owned by individuals in the top 1%-0.1% of the personal income distribution. Panel D considers
firms owned by individuals in the top 0.1% of the personal income distribution. See Appendix Figure A.8
for a version that measures workers using both employees and contractors rather than just employees, and
Appendix Figure A.9 for similar results for profit margins.
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Figure 9: Diverging Firm Profitability, Not Risk or Assortativeness
A. Risk Decreases with Owner Income Rank
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Notes: Panel A plots measures of risk in the main analysis sample by owner personal income rank. The
circles plot the share of 2001 firms within each personal income rank that had exited the sample by 2014,
weighting by the firm’s 2001 number of employees. The squares and triangles plot a measure of the mean
Sharpe ratio across firms. Our Sharpe ratio is defined as the average profits per worker at firms owned
by individuals within the personal income bin divided by the standard deviation of profits per worker at
those firms, weighting firms by their number of workers and then averaging ratios across the listed years.
Panel B plots the average profitability rank of S-corporations for different groups of owners ranked by their
personal income. Panel C plots percentiles of the distribution of profits per worker in a given year among
S-corporations. Appendix Figure A.10 shows similar results for the ratio of sales to costs. See Section 6.3
for additional detail.
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Figure 10: Growth in S-Corporation Profits Accounting for Organizational Form Changes
A. S-Corporation Share of Activity B. Number of S-Corporations
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Notes: Panel A shows the S-corporation shares of total business activity since 1980 (measured as the sum of
C-corporations, S-corporations, and partnerships). Panel B shows the number of S-corporations by owner
income group since 2001, which is the period for which the US Treasury tax files enable us to link firms
and owners. Panel C decomposes the level of S-corporation profits between 2001 and 2014 into actual S-
corporation profits and the share attributed to organizational form changes. The decomposition assumes
the level of S-corporation sales is a constant share of total business sales (including S-corporations, C-
corporations, and partnerships) for each 4-digit NAICS industry. The top bars represent the share of
S-corporation profits that are due to S-corporations having a higher share of total business sales relative to
2001. Panel D applies the same transformation to decompose the growth in S-corporation profits among
those with top 0.1% owners. The first series shows how actual S-corporation profits increased since 2001.
The second series shows a counterfactual series, which assumes that S-corporation sales are a constant share
of total business sector activity equal to the initial S-corporation share in 2001.
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Figure 11: Impact of Organizational Form Switch on Labor Payments and Profits
A. All Switchers B. Physician & Dentist Switchers
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-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
Ou
tco
m
e 
Re
lat
ive
 to
 S
ale
s
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Years Since Switch
Labor Compensation Profits
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
Ou
tco
m
e 
Re
lat
ive
 to
 S
ale
s
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Years Since Switch
Labor Compensation Profits
Notes: This figure shows how the allocation of value-added to labor compensation and profits responds when
a firm switches organizational form from C-corporation to S-corporation. For each year in event time around
a switching event, we plot the average of profits divided by sales and the average of labor compensation
(including officer compensation) divided by sales, conditional on firm and calendar year fixed effects. Panel
A shows the impact for all switch events between 2001 and 2014. The sample includes 259,957 S-corporations
that have switched from C-corporate to S-corporate form between 2001-2014; are of non-trivial size, which
we define as having at least $150,000 in sales in the best year they are alive from 2001-2014; and are active
for at least 4 years prior to the switch event. Panel B shows the impact for the subsample of 19,539 switch
events in the offices of physicians (NAICS 6211) and offices of dentists (NAICS 6212) industries. Panel C
shows the impact for the sample of 3,159 switch events for firms with mean sales above $50M in 2014 dollars.
Panel D shows the impact for the sample of 220,828 switch events for firms with mean sales below $5M in
2014 dollars. 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 12: The Overstated Decline in the Labor Share and Disguised Wages
A. The Decline of the Labor Share is Overstated
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Notes: In circles, Panel A plots the labor share in the corporate sector from Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014). In squares, we plot a adjusted series that accounts for disguised wages from S-corporations. We
estimate the magnitude of disguised wages as follows. We use the point estimate from Figure 11A that labor
payments decline 1.95% as a share of sales when C-corporations switch to S-corporations. We then assign
1.95% of aggregate S-corporation sales as disguised wages. This product generates an adjustment that grows
with the size of the S-corporation sector. In 2012, the last year for which labor share data are provided
by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), our estimate implies that roughly $116B of aggregate S-corporation
profits are disguised wages. Our counterfactual series shows a decline of 6.3 percentage points, 16% smaller
than in the raw data. Panel B plots our estimate of disguised wages as a share of corporate sector value
added over time.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on S-Corporations and Their Owners
A. Firm Summary Statistics
A. All Firms B. Firms with Top 1-0.1% Owner C. Firms with Top 0.1% Owner
Mean p10 p50 p90 Mean p10 p50 p90 Mean p10 p50 p90
Sales 1,816 20.24 262.61 2,628 4,253 54.24 1,248 9,904 22,390 58.09 3,530 49,624
Profits 92.61 -26.53 13.90 181.73 232.90 -25.96 122.79 689.36 1,585 -79.58 275.01 3,662
Profit Margin 0.05 -0.19 0.05 0.40 0.11 -0.03 0.08 0.43 0.12 -0.02 0.08 0.46
Assets 928.74 0 53.90 918.73 1,873 11.41 308.45 3,731 14,080 37.56 1,407 21,941
Employees 13.84 0 2 25.23 32.68 0 6.84 70.40 102.59 0 10.41 189.70
Employees | Employees > 0 20.46 1 5 37.10 43.09 1.24 12.76 89.40 150.79 2.30 34.86 267.21
Number of owners 1.62 1 1 2.43 2.23 1 1.38 4 3.37 1 2 6.20
Sales per worker 194.93 22.62 88.25 361.95 323.28 31.22 139.69 646.62 864.84 29.20 190.26 1,239
Profits per worker 18.36 -5.55 4.19 47.52 39.59 -2 10.53 111.42 139 -4.84 11.69 186.02
Profits per worker, employees-weighted 5.51 -1.73 1 15.98 6.27 -0.38 1.52 17.52 12.23 -0.02 2.63 28.28
Profits per owner 56.74 -18.81 10.34 131.85 152.50 -14.14 72.39 462.50 818.04 -37.12 122.94 2,053
Owner payments 145.93 -13.96 37.16 309.65 398.65 -8.60 291.51 1,011 1,788 -45.97 453.51 4,373
Owner payments per owner 91.43 -10.12 27.67 217.93 247.61 -4.64 176.97 649.40 949.99 -21.23 199.59 2,407
Owner payments per worker 36.01 -1.18 13.42 84.85 72.66 0.38 25.22 208.46 190.35 -1.68 19.98 301.20
Owner payments / Profit 1.68 0.26 1 4.08 2.05 0.92 1.14 4.24 1.56 0.76 1 2.25
Owner payments / Sales 0.13 -0.19 0.13 0.60 0.20 -0.05 0.16 0.70 0.16 -0.12 0.11 0.78
Owner payments / Value added 0.18 -0.34 0.23 0.68 0.27 -0.09 0.31 0.78 0.25 -0.22 0.27 0.87
Number of firm-years 44,234,276 4,966,242 1,378,482
B. Owner Summary Statistics
A. All Owners B. Top 1-0.1% Owners C. Top 0.1% Owners
Mean p10 p50 p90 Mean p10 p50 p90 Mean p10 p50 p90
Income 212.45 14.82 97.73 421.67 645.72 390.46 560.15 1,076 4,511 1,549 2,391 7,487
Age 49.99 34.64 49.77 66.37 52.11 38.77 51.53 66.89 54.94 40.90 54.37 70.94
Number of Firms Owned 1.15 1 1 1.72 1.34 1 1 2 1.82 1 1 3.18
Wage Income 70.49 0 30.52 157.15 204.73 0 147.79 489.49 743.90 0 248.93 1,753
S-Corporation Income 59.41 -15.52 8.46 130.93 196.88 -4.20 125.28 546.42 1,528 -4.49 739.29 3,344
Total Owner Payments 99.13 -8.23 26.33 227.38 320.07 -0.19 282.26 758.47 1,871 -0.43 1,160 3,935
Business Income 71.73 -18.79 9.96 162.93 259.47 -0.59 215.61 650.21 2,328 10.27 1,370 4,682
Scorp Income / Owner Pmt 0.68 0.03 1 1 0.71 0.12 0.86 1 0.82 0.33 1 1
Wage Income / Income 0.65 0 0.29 0.95 0.33 0 0.25 0.82 0.21 0 0.09 0.70
Owner Payment / Income 0.74 -0.08 0.38 1.01 0.49 0 0.50 1 0.48 0 0.48 0.98
Business Income / Income 0.22 -0.17 0.16 0.84 0.38 0 0.40 0.82 0.53 0 0.64 0.92
Only Earns Passive Income 0.08 0 0 0 0.07 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0
Number of owner-years 62,434,916 6,008,571 1,110,122
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Notes to Table 1: This table presents summary statistics for our main sample of S-corporations linked to owners for 2001-2014. Dollar values are in
thousands of 2014 dollars. The main sample comprises 71.8M firm-owner-year observations. Table A pools distinct firm-year observations. Table B
pools distinct owner-year observations. All statistics are unweighted, unless otherwise specified. All variables are annual and are available in all years.
Year refers to calendar year, which by law is also each S-corporation’s fiscal year. Sales is the firm’s operating revenue (gross sales minus returns)
as listed on the 1120S. Passively earned income (e.g., interest on bank deposits) is excluded. Profits is the firm’s ordinary business income, equal to
operating revenue minus costs as listed on the 1120S. Costs equals the sum of inputs (cost of goods sold), employee and owner wage compensation,
rent, interest, capital asset tax depreciation, and other deductions related to ordinary business. Profits are divided among owners pro rata according
to ownership stakes on Forms K-1, which owners then include on their Form 1040, Schedule E. Profits per worker equals profits divided by the number
of workers. Number of workers and number of employees equals the number of individuals who received a W-2 from the firm that year. Value added
is sales minus cost of goods sold as itemized on the 1120S. Assets is the end-of-year book value of assets on the 1120S. Income is short for personal
income is the main income concept used in Piketty and Saez (2003) and equals Form 1040 total income minus Form 1040 capital gains minus Form
1040 unemployment compensation minus Form 1040 taxable social security benefits. Age is age as of December 31, based on year of birth from Social
Security records housed alongside tax records. An owner is a top 1-0.1% owner or a top 0.1% owner if her personal income lies in the top 1% but not
the top 0.1% or the top 0.1% of all tax units in the year, respectively. Wage income equals W-2 income. S-corporation income equals the owner’s
share of the profits from all S-corporations she owns. Total owner payments equals S-corporation income plus wage income from the S-corporations
she owns. Business income is total pass-through business income and equals total Form 1040, Schedule E income. An owner’s S-corporation income
is active if the owner reports she materially participates in the operations of any of her pass-through businesses (see the previous subsection) and
is passive otherwise. For these summary statistics, two variables are winsorized in the underlying data at the unweighted first percentile and the
unweighted ninety-ninth percentile of the annual distributions: Owner payments / Profit, and Business income / Income. Two variables are winsorized
below at −1 and above at 1: Profit margin, Owner payments / Sales, and Owner payments / Value added. Assets is set to missing for the very few
observations in which assets are over one trillion. 32.3% of all firm-year observations have zero employees; those figures are 24.3% and 32.1% for
top-1-0.1%-owned firms top-0.1%-owned firms, respectively. Zero employees can reflect the inability to match firms to workers, when firms use special
employer identification numbers on W-2 forms. See Sections 2-3 for more details.
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Table 2: Industrial Composition of S-Corporation Profits (Top 1-0.1% vs. Top 0.1%, 2014)
Top 0.1% Owners Top 1-0.1% Owners
Industry (NAICS) Rank Profits Share of All Industry (NAICS) Rank Profits Share of All
Management of cos/enterprises (5511) 1 12870 1.018 Offices of physicians (6211) 1 8980 0.546
Other financial investment actvty (5239) 2 7815 0.893 Other professional/technical svc (5419) 2 4890 0.314
Automobile dealers (4411) 3 6482 0.853 Offices of dentists (6212) 3 4430 0.56
Other professional/technical svc (5419) 4 5157 0.389 Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389) 4 4300 0.33
Oil/gas extraction (2111) 5 4359 1.633 Legal svc (5411) 5 3540 0.352
Offices of physicians (6211) 6 4266 0.287 Architectural/engineering svc (5413) 6 2880 0.369
Misc. durable goods merch whlsl (4239) 7 4244 0.654 Restaurants (7225) 7 2850 0.425
Management/techncl consulting svc (5416) 8 3889 0.479 Building equipment cntrctr (2382) 8 2780 0.329
Computer sys design/related svc (5415) 9 3861 0.399 Computer sys design/related svc (5415) 9 2680 0.29
Other heavy constr (2379) 10 3835 0.75 Insurance agencies/brokerages (5242) 10 2680 0.315
Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389) 11 3815 0.372 Management/techncl consulting svc (5416) 11 2230 0.271
Other fabricated metal prod mfg. (3329) 12 3695 0.653 Offices of other health practitioners (6213) 12 1960 0.315
Other miscellaneous mfg. (3399) 13 3684 0.705 Nonresidential building constr (2362) 13 1920 0.343
Misc. nondrbl gds merch whlsl (4249) 14 3240 0.672 Misc. durable goods merch whlsl (4239) 14 1720 0.262
Legal svc (5411) 15 3048 0.332 Other fabricated metal prod mfg. (3329) 15 1680 0.269
Nonresidential building constr (2362) 16 2823 0.607 Building foundation/exterior cntrctr (2381) 16 1570 0.296
Activities related to real estate (5313) 17 2658 0.737 Activities related to real estate (5313) 17 1530 0.373
Plastics product mfg. (3261) 18 2573 0.808 Other financial investment actvty (5239) 18 1500 0.145
Restaurants (7225) 19 2457 0.356 Other miscellaneous mfg. (3399) 19 1460 0.249
Building equipment cntrctr (2382) 20 2438 0.347 Automobile dealers (4411) 20 1460 0.204
Insurance agencies/brokerages (5242) 21 2350 0.293 Residential building constr (2361) 21 1410 0.267
Architectural/engineering svc (5413) 22 2251 0.287 Offices of real estate agents/brokers (5312) 22 1290 0.278
Machinery/supply merch whlsl (4238) 23 2047 0.553 Management of cos/enterprises (5511) 23 1180 0.091
Building material/supp dealers (4441) 24 2011 0.665 Machinery/supply merch whlsl (4238) 24 1150 0.336
Residential building constr (2361) 25 1889 0.596 Misc. nondrbl gds merch whlsl (4249) 25 1090 0.228
Nondepository credit intrmd (5222) 26 1862 0.722 Health/personal care stores (4461) 26 1080 0.461
Other miscellaneous store retailers (4539) 27 1705 0.524 Accounting/bookkeeping svc (5412) 27 1030 0.241
Electric goods merch whlsl (4236) 28 1695 0.697 Oil/gas extraction (2111) 28 1030 0.438
Depository credit intrmd (5221) 29 1648 0.799 Other personal svc (8129) 29 1020 0.273
Grocery/related product whlsl (4244) 30 1585 0.643 Advertising, pr,/related svc (5418) 30 996 0.327
Notes: This table presents statistics on the level of S-corporation profits in 2014 by 4-digit industry. We present statistics for two groups of firms:
S-corporations owned by the top 1-0.1% and S-corporations owned by the top 0.1%. The rows are sorted by the level of S-corporation profits for
firms owned by the top 0.1% and top 1-0.1%, respectively. Rank columns indicate the rank of that 4-digit industry within a particular group of firms.
Profits columns indicate the level of profits in millions of 2014 dollars. Share of All columns indicate the share of profits for a particular group of firms
relative to profits in that industry for all S-corporations. This share can exceed one in the case of losses for non-top firms. See Appendix Table A.2
for statistics that apportion S-corporation profits pro rata to owners in either the top 0.1% or the top 1-0.1% and then aggregate those apportioned
profits by 4-digit industry.
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Table 3: Industrial Composition of Pass-Through Profits (S-Corporations vs. Partnerships, 2014)
Top 0.1% Owners Top 1-0.1% Owners
Industry (NAICS) S Rank S Profits P Rank P Profits Industry (NAICS) S Rank S Profits P Rank P Profits
Management of cos/enterprises (5511) 1 12870 5 5547 Offices of physicians (6211) 1 8980 2 4640
Other financial investment actvty (5239) 2 7815 1 40860 Other professional/technical svc (5419) 2 4890 7 1760
Automobile dealers (4411) 3 6482 16 1216 Offices of dentists (6212) 3 4430 13 709
Other professional/technical svc (5419) 4 5157 11 2721 Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389) 4 4300 18 544
Oil/gas extraction (2111) 5 4359 3 8825 Legal svc (5411) 5 3540 1 10400
Offices of physicians (6211) 6 4266 6 5210 Architectural/engineering svc (5413) 6 2880 15 603
Misc. durable goods merch whlsl (4239) 7 4244 23 814 Restaurants (7225) 7 2850 11 788
Management/techncl consulting svc (5416) 8 3889 10 2763 Building equipment cntrctr (2382) 8 2780 42 225
Computer sys design/related svc (5415) 9 3861 53 274 Computer sys design/related svc (5415) 9 2680 25 401
Other heavy constr (2379) 10 3835 46 341 Insurance agencies/brokerages (5242) 10 2680 16 601
Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389) 11 3815 33 516 Management/techncl consulting svc (5416) 11 2230 9 1140
Other fabricated metal prod mfg. (3329) 12 3695 41 390 Offices of other health practitioners (6213) 12 1960 12 728
Other miscellaneous mfg. (3399) 13 3684 24 793 Nonresidential building constr (2362) 13 1920 30 354
Misc. nondrbl gds merch whlsl (4249) 14 3240 22 906 Misc. durable goods merch whlsl (4239) 14 1720 33 345
Legal svc (5411) 15 3048 2 38600 Other fabricated metal prod mfg. (3329) 15 1680 44 211
Nonresidential building constr (2362) 16 2823 37 411 Building foundation/exterior cntrctr (2381) 16 1570 46 186
Activities related to real estate (5313) 17 2658 8 3761 Activities related to real estate (5313) 17 1530 10 1040
Plastics product mfg. (3261) 18 2573 54 272 Other financial investment actvty (5239) 18 1500 4 2580
Restaurants (7225) 19 2457 21 995 Other miscellaneous mfg. (3399) 19 1460 24 407
Building equipment cntrctr (2382) 20 2438 55 258 Automobile dealers (4411) 20 1460 23 423
Insurance agencies/brokerages (5242) 21 2350 17 1179 Residential building constr (2361) 21 1410 21 481
Architectural/engineering svc (5413) 22 2251 29 639 Offices of real estate agents/brokers (5312) 22 1290 27 390
Machinery/supply merch whlsl (4238) 23 2047 60 247 Management of cos/enterprises (5511) 23 1180 22 468
Building material/supp dealers (4441) 24 2011 96 109 Machinery/supply merch whlsl (4238) 24 1150 43 223
Residential building constr (2361) 25 1889 20 999 Misc. nondrbl gds merch whlsl (4249) 25 1090 37 268
Nondepository credit intrmd (5222) 26 1862 13 1789 Health/personal care stores (4461) 26 1080 40 231
Other miscellaneous store retailers (4539) 27 1705 61 245 Accounting/bookkeeping svc (5412) 27 1030 5 2270
Electric goods merch whlsl (4236) 28 1695 79 171 Oil/gas extraction (2111) 28 1030 3 3520
Depository credit intrmd (5221) 29 1648 47 337 Other personal svc (8129) 29 1020 32 345
Grocery/related product whlsl (4244) 30 1585 93 111 Advertising, pr,/related svc (5418) 30 996 28 382
Notes: This table presents statistics on the level of S-corporation and partnership profits in 2014 by 4-digit industry. We present statistics for two
groups of firms: S-corporations and partnerships owned by the top 1-0.1%, and S-corporations and partnerships owned by the top 0.1%. The rows
are sorted by the level of S-corporation profits for firms owned by the top 0.1% and top 1-0.1%, respectively. Rank columns indicate the rank of that
4-digit industry within a particular group of firms. Profits columns indicate the level of profits in millions of 2014 dollars. See Appendix Table A.3
for statistics that apportion S-corporation and partnership profits pro rata to owners in either the top 0.1% or the top 1-0.1% and then aggregate
those apportioned profits by 4-digit industry.
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Table 4: Impact of Owner Death on Firm Outcomes
A. Top 1% Owner Death
Firm survival (pp) Profits per pre-period worker ($/worker)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Owner death -0.210 -12,307 -5,090 -5,291 -18,947 1,387
(0.010) (1,914) (2,093) (2,451) (2,905) (1,885)
Surviving firms only X
Dying minority owner X
Dying majority owner X
Owner death before 65 X X X X X
Owner death after 75 X
Number of observations 2,717,748 2,717,748 1,076,256 1,030,275 1,687,473 137,277
Number of owner deaths 2,509 2,509 1,440 1,220 1,289 1,838
R2 .072 .003 .000 .001 .008 .000
Outcome mean of coutnerfactual firms 0.852 24,015 26,071 22,149 25,781 15,109
Estimate/Outcome mean -24.7% -51.2% -19.5% -23.9% -73.5% 9.2%
Ownership share of dying owners 60.2% 60.2% 49.3% 31.6% 87.3% 52.2%
Estimate/Outcome mean/Ownership share -41.0% -85.1% -39.6% -75.5% -84.2% 17.6%
Preferred percentage impact -29.3% -60.7% -39.6% -53.9% -60.1% 12.6%
B. Top 0.1% Owner Death
Firm survival (pp) Profits per pre-period worker ($/worker)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Owner death -0.223 -32,646 -13,564 -6,511 -56,267 3,184
(0.024) (11,276) (12,478) (11,255) (18,799) (4,544)
Surviving firms only X
Dying minority owner X
Dying majority owner X
Owner death before 65 X X X X X
Owner death after 75 X
Number of observations 221,004 221,004 101,700 97,947 123,057 48,195
Number of owner deaths 455 455 239 216 239 559
R2 .068 .004 .001 .000 .012 .000
Outcome mean of coutnerfactual firms 0.825 45,253 55,528 40,127 49,886 21,704
Estimate/Outcome mean -27.0% -72.1% -24.4% -16.2% -112.8% 14.7%
Ownership share of dying owners 61.3% 61.3% 50.3% 31.6% 88.1% 53.6%
Estimate/Outcome mean/Ownership share -44.1% -117.7% -48.6% -51.3% -128.1% 27.4%
Preferred percentage impact -33.8% -90.2% -48.6% -39.3% -98.1% 21.0%
Notes: The owner deaths analysis sample comprises 2,509 firms with dying non-elderly owners matched to
301,972 similar firms without an owner death. This table uses the owner deaths analysis sample to analyze
the impact of owner deaths on firm performance four years after owner death relative to one year before
owner death, relative to the matched counterfactual firms. Columns 1-2 report the right-most coefficients
plotted in Figures 5A-B. See the notes to that figure for details. Column 3 repeats column 2 on the subset
of matched pairs of owner-death firms and counterfactual firms that survived four years after the owner
death. Column 4 repeats column 2 on the subset of matched pairs where the dying owner had 50% or less
ownership in the owner-death firm; column 5 repeats column 2 on all other pairs. Column 6 repeats column
2 in an identically constructed sample of matched owner-death firms that is based on owners who died at
age 75 or greater. The outcome mean of counterfactual firms is the weighted mean four years after owner
death (see the text for the weight). The ownership share of dying owners is measured in the year before
owner death. The final row multiplies the penultimate row by 71.4% except for the intensive margin columns
3 and 9, given our estimate that 28.6% of owner-death firm exits represent firm reorganizations. Panel B
repeats Panel A for for the subset of owner-death and counterfactual firms with a top-0.1% owner, using an
analogous 23.4% figure for the reorganization share when computing the final row. See Section 5 for more
details.
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Table 5: Decomposition of Profit Growth
Share of Profit Growth (%)
Industry Profit Growth Rate Profitability Workers per Owner Owners per Firm Firms % Total Profits (2014)
Panel A: All Owners
Overall 131.53 80.96 -26.60 -12.87 58.51 100.00
Agriculture & Forestry 942.78 84.46 2.20 -4.46 17.79 1.82
Construction & Mining 66.02 77.75 -46.40 -14.38 83.03 13.34
Manufacturing 136.92 116.88 -23.72 -12.46 19.30 14.05
Retail & Wholesale Trade 110.01 91.82 -28.11 -13.51 49.79 21.87
Info & Professional Svcs 159.53 77.95 -25.61 -11.28 58.94 30.76
Health Care 179.33 42.48 -18.70 -10.07 86.29 10.31
Entertnmt, Food & Hotels 196.05 86.13 -20.59 -9.13 43.59 4.53
Other Svcs 131.48 74.94 -28.66 -9.17 62.89 3.16
Panel B: Top 1-0.1% Owners
Overall 115.10 84.46 -14.47 -15.77 45.77 100.00
Agriculture & Forestry 505.15 85.47 -7.71 -5.98 28.23 1.92
Construction & Mining 70.82 83.34 -2.02 -5.86 24.54 13.90
Manufacturing 115.95 124.11 -17.32 -17.61 10.82 11.10
Retail & Wholesale Trade 84.60 104.17 -20.10 -19.58 35.52 19.46
Info & Professional Svcs 134.20 79.96 -9.99 -12.08 42.11 29.39
Health Care 168.47 45.88 -9.33 -9.32 72.78 16.49
Entertnmt, Food & Hotels 129.43 87.38 -18.16 -15.03 45.80 4.82
Other Svcs 104.32 77.61 -8.33 -16.32 47.05 2.81
Panel C: Top 0.1% Owners
Overall 93.16 81.69 -3.80 -5.87 27.98 100.00
Agriculture & Forestry 231.54 86.42 -22.78 7.74 28.62 1.32
Construction & Mining 30.73 168.60 -23.67 -20.72 -24.21 11.18
Manufacturing 88.33 110.47 -20.49 -10.34 20.37 21.45
Retail & Wholesale Trade 80.39 86.50 -4.15 -12.66 30.30 26.62
Info & Professional Svcs 146.05 71.17 4.41 6.16 18.26 29.49
Health Care 138.28 52.57 3.67 -16.23 59.99 5.06
Entertnmt, Food & Hotels 103.74 73.56 9.21 -24.11 41.35 3.72
Other Svcs 86.10 115.34 -18.30 -28.52 31.48 1.12
Notes: This table decomposes the share of growth in business income by profitability and scale metrics. The growth rate for profits and each of its
profitability and scale components is gx = 100 ∗ (x14x01 − 1), where x is the variable in question. The log growth of profits can be decomposed into
log(1 + gΠ) = log(1 + gpi/L) + log(1 + gL/Owner) + log(1 + gOwner/Firms) + log(1 + gFirms). We calculate 100 ∗ log(1 + g(·))/log(1 + gΠ), the percent
contribution of each component to growth in profits. Decompositions of profit levels for 2001 and 2014 are presented in Appendix Tables A.6 and
A.7, respectively. Growth decompositions by state for top-1-0.1% and top 0.1% firms are presented in Appendix Tables A.8 and A.9, respectively.
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Figure A.1: Rising U.S. Income Inequality and Business Income
A. The Rise in Income Inequality
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Notes: Panel A uses data from Piketty and Saez (2003) to plot the share of personal income earned by the
top 1%, top 1-0.1%, top 0.1-0.01%, and top 0.01%, respectively. Panel B uses the underlying source of Panel
A (see Section 2.4) to decompose the top 0.1% income share into two components: labor income (i.e. wages,
salaries, and tips and pensions and annuities, as done in Piketty and Saez) and capital income (i.e., business
income, interest, rents, royalties, estates, and trusts) since 1990. Panel C decomposes capital income into
income from different business entity types: pass-through firms, C-corporations (in the form of dividends)
and other capital income.
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Figure A.2: Income Inequality for the Top 1-0.1% versus the Top 0.1%
A. Business Income vs. Other Types of Income
Business Income Labor Income Other Capital Income
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B. Types of Business Income
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Notes: Panel A uses data from Piketty and Saez (2003) to decompose the share of personal income earned by the top 1% into shares earned by the
top 1-0.1% and top 0.1%, respectively, into components from labor income, business income, and other capital income (i.e., interest, rents, royalties,
estates, and trusts) since 1990. Panel B decomposes business income into income from different business entity types: S-corporations, partnerships,
and C-corporations (in the form of dividends).
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Figure A.3: Distribution of Firm Sales by Corporate Form and Ownership Status
A. C-Corporations B. S-Corporations
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C. Top 1-0.1% Owned S-Corporations D. Top 0.1% Owned S-Corporations
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Notes: Panel A, B, C and D show the distribution of firms by share of total sales across time using the SOI corporate sample for A and B and the
linked owner data for C and D. Panel A shows the distribution of C-corporations by sales bin in 2002, 2007 and 2014. Panel B is similar and plots
the distribution of S-corporations by sales bin for the same set of years. Panel C shows the distribution of top 1-0.1% owned S-corporations in 2002,
2007 and 2014 by sales bin. Panel D is similar and shows the distribution of top 0.1% owned S-corporations, for the same set of years.
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Figure A.4: Distribution of Firm Profits by Corporate Form and Ownership Status
A. C-Corporations B. S-Corporations
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Notes: Panel A, B, C and D show the distribution of firms by share of total profits across time using the SOI corporate sample for A and B and the
linked owner data for C and D. These Panels show the same statistics as Appendix Figure A.3 for firm sales.
66
Figure A.5: Share of Passive Owners and Business Income by Age Group
A. Top 1-0.1% Passive Owners B. Top 1-0.1% Business Income ($B)
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C. Top 0.1% Passive Owners D. Top 0.1% Business Income ($B)
0
5
10
15
20
Sh
ar
e 
Pa
ss
ive
 O
wn
er
 (%
)
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Year
20-30 31-40 41-50 51-60
61-70 71-80 81-90 >90
0
10
20
30
40
50
Bu
sin
es
s I
nc
om
e 
(B
illi
on
 $
)
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Year
20-30 31-40 41-50 51-60
61-70 71-80 81-90 >90
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of passive ownership and business income over time, by age group.
Panel A and C plot passive owners as a share of total. Passive owners report that they do not materially
participate in the firm’s operation. Panel B and D plot total business income in billions of current dollars.
Panel A and B show share of passive owners and total business income for firm owners with personal income
in the top 1-0.1% of the distribution. Panel C and D show share of passive owners and total business income
for firm owners with personal income in the top 0.1% of the distribution. Owners under age 20 were omitted
because the number of owners in this age group in the top 1% and top 0.1% is zero or close to zero.
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Figure A.6: Profitability-Income Gradient with Profit and Workers Apportionment
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Notes: This figure replicates Figure 6A when apportioning profits and workers to owners according to their
ownership shares. Each firm-owner observation underlying Figure 6A uses the firm’s profits and number of
workers when computing profitability, regardless of how much of the firm the owner owns. Each firm-owner
observation underlying this figure’s alternative to Figure 6A uses apportioned profits and workers using the
owner’s ownership share, defined as the owner’s 2014 profits from the firm divided the firm’s total 2014
profits. Profit shares at S-corporations equals ownership shares by law. See the notes to Figure 6A for
further details.
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Figure A.7: Top-Owned Firms Superior Profitability Is Not Due to Higher Capital Intensity
A. Profitability by Owner Income B. Profitability by Owner Rank
Rank in Two Sample Industries Controlling for Capital Intensity
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C. Top 0.1% Profitability Controlling for Capital Intensity by Year
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Notes: Panel A repeats the 2014 within-industry profitability series of Figure 6A for two large industries
with different capital intensities: the highly capital intensive Beverage and tobacco manufacturing industry
(NAICS 312) and the lightly capital intensive Performing arts and spectator sports industry (NAICS 711).
See the notes to 6A for additional detail. Panel B repeats the 2014 within-industry series of Figure 6A in
the sample of S-corporation owners whose firms can be matched to capital stock information in the SOI
S-corporation sample. One series controls only for industry fixed effects while the second series controls
additionally for capital intensity, equal to the firm’s capital stock divided by its costs, winsorized at the 99th
percentile. Panel C plots the time series of top-0.1% profitability in the sample of owners whose firms can
be matched to the SOI sample, controlling for industry fixed effects and additionally for capital intensity in
a pooled regression using all years.
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Figure A.8: Profitability versus Scale (Including Contractors)
A. Profitability Differences are Diverging B. Firm Size Differences are Not
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Notes: This figure is similar to Figure 8, but it defines total employment is the sum of total W-2 payees
and 1099 recipients (contractors). Panel A plots aggregate profits per worker in thousands of dollars by
year and owner personal income relative to total distribution. Panel B plots workers per firm by year and
owner personal income. Panel C decomposes the growth in S-corporation profits of firms with top 1-0.1%
owners into a scale (number of workers per owner, number of owners per firm and number of firms) and
a profitability (profits per worker) component. Panel D decomposes the growth in S-corporation profits of
firms with top 0.1% owners into the same components as Panel C.
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Figure A.9: Profit Margins versus Sales Decomposition
A. Profit Margins B. Sales per Firm
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Notes: This figure is similar to Figure 8, but assesses different metrics of profitability and scale. Profitability
is proxied by profit margins, calculated as the ratio of aggregate profits to aggregate sales, and scale is
measured by sales per firm. Panel A plots profit margins by year and owner type. Panel B plots sales per
firm by year and owner type. Panel C decomposes the growth in S-corporation profits of firms with top
1-0.1% owners into profit margins and sales components (sales per owner, number of owners per firm and
number of firms). Panel D decomposes the growth in S-corporation profits of firms with top 0.1% owners
into the same components as Panel C.
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Figure A.10: The Distribution of S-Corporation Profitability by Year
Firm-level Percentiles of Markups Over Cost
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Notes: This figure plots how percentiles of S-corporation aggregate markups of sales over costs evolved from
2000 to 2014.
Figure A.11: The Marginal Labor Income Tax Rate Falls at the Top
42
42
.2
42
.4
42
.6
42
.8
M
ar
gi
na
l t
ax
 ra
te
 (%
)
1m-5m 5m-10m 10m-50m 50m-100m 100m-1bn
Personal income
Notes: This figure plots our estimate of the 2014 marginal federal tax rate on labor income—wage income
plus the labor component of S-corporation income—implied by our results. The marginal tax rate falls at
the top because active S-corporation income is a larger share of total labor income at the top but is not
subject to the 2.9% Medicare tax and 0.9% ACA Additional Medicare Tax. See Section 7 for additional
details.
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Figure A.12: Impact of Top 1% and Top 0.1% Owner Death on Firm Performance
A. Sales of Top 1% Owned B. Employment Top 1% Owned ($K)
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C. Sales of Top 0.1% Owned D. Employment of Top 0.1% Owned ($K)
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Notes: This figure repeats Figure 5 for two alternative outcomes. See the notes to that figure for details.
Panels A and C analyze the outcome of annual firm sales divided by the firm’s mean annual sales [t−4, t−1]
relative to the owner death year t. Panels B and D analyze the outcome of annual firm number of workers
divided by the firm’s mean annual number of workers [t − 4, t − 1]. Each outcome is winsorized among
owner-death firms and counterfactual firms at the unweighted first and ninety-ninth percentiles of its pooled
[t− 4, t− 1] distribution among owner-death firms. Firms that exit are assigned zero sales, zero profits, and
zero workers following exit.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics on Partnerships and Their Owners
A. Firm Summary Statistics
A. All Firms B. Firms with Top 1-0.1% Owner C. Firms with Top 0.1% Owner
Mean p10 p50 p90 Mean p10 p50 p90 Mean p10 p50 p90
Sales 1,879 4.28 135.03 2,042 2,503 4.98 360.33 4,902 11,830 7.20 625.34 14,402
Profits -149.46 -47.74 5.26 236.01 233.24 -80.02 22.16 785.98 1,567 -261.62 36.68 2,571
Profit Margin 0.06 -0.80 0.05 0.85 0.14 -0.57 0.10 0.96 0.16 -0.57 0.11 0.99
Employees 10.29 0 0 17.80 17.74 0 0 38.11 38.34 0 0 73.13
Employees | Employees > 0 30.78 1.27 7.71 58.82 45.45 2 13.55 93.45 113.36 2.81 28.51 208.23
Number of owners 5.55 1.29 2 4.31 4.18 2 2 7.50 42.70 1.64 3 22.97
Sales per worker 202.64 12.43 71.73 369.65 280.03 16.28 109 523.09 502.75 14.87 97.79 779.29
Profits per worker 2.14 -12.06 1.98 59.74 37.72 -11.80 5.55 116.59 74.94 -36.16 2.53 155.53
Profits per worker, employees-weighted -21.36 -3.91 0.65 29.60 8.74 -2.52 0.98 31.14 23.91 -2.82 2.03 78.02
Profits per owner -108.91 -20.85 2.26 100.94 83.89 -26.85 7.40 306.14 340.64 -58.41 7.32 738.73
Owner payments 130.28 -34.01 5.17 211.09 206.23 -51.44 18.66 698.52 1,133 -151.72 23.70 1,817
Owner payments per owner 34.23 -14.79 2.23 89.06 66.47 -17.36 6.20 273.71 213.51 -33.73 4.61 527.90
Owner payments per worker 20.26 -7.97 2.96 60.74 38.51 -6.93 6.38 115.21 67.56 -19.50 2.49 143.41
Owner payments / Profit 0.91 0.43 1 1 0.88 0.30 1 1 0.78 0.16 0.98 1
Owner payments / Sales 0.06 -0.79 0.05 0.79 0.13 -0.63 0.09 0.93 0.12 -0.77 0.08 0.94
Owner payments / Value added 0.09 -0.96 0.10 0.87 0.17 -0.81 0.16 0.97 0.16 -0.90 0.14 0.97
Number of firm-years 15,520,662 2,527,146 1,133,058
B. Owner Summary Statistics
A. All Owners B. Top 1-0.1% Owners C. Top 0.1% Owners
Mean p10 p50 p90 Mean p10 p50 p90 Mean p10 p50 p90
Income 250.18 11.01 95.13 517.45 659.93 395.21 576.59 1,096 4,782 1,567 2,455 8,127
Age 53.21 33.67 52.95 74.81 52.81 39.01 52.11 68.21 54.04 40.33 53.31 69.92
Number of Firms Owned 1.56 1 1 2.81 1.94 1 1 3.73 3.03 1 2 6.55
Wage Income 80.83 0 1.62 174.78 205.46 0 79.05 593.62 1,113 0 186.50 2,779
Partnership Income 33.47 -6.01 0.03 58.16 117.98 -5.07 2.83 476.25 608.29 -18.22 5.55 1,867
Total Owner Payments 35.96 -5.48 0.05 68.04 123.55 -4.80 3.22 490.59 620.40 -17.83 5.90 1,898
Business Income 72.04 -10.23 0.12 175.26 235.57 -4.80 121.25 689.85 1,835 -31.47 974.67 4,028
Partnership Income / Owner Pmt 0.98 1 1 1 0.98 1 1 1 0.99 1 1 1
Wage Income / Income 0.62 0 0 0.96 0.32 0 0.13 0.94 0.27 0 0.06 0.95
Owner Payment / Income 3.27 -0.05 0 0.69 0.19 -0.01 0 0.87 0.16 -0.01 0 0.84
Business Income / Income 0.20 -0.07 0.01 0.95 0.34 -0.01 0.21 0.96 0.41 -0.01 0.42 0.96
Only Earns Passive Income 0.15 0 0 1 0.14 0 0 1 0.09 0 0 0.39
Number of owner-years 55,229,572 6,526,191 1,324,245
Notes: This table replicates Table 1 for partnerships. The underlying sample are the 86.2M partnership-owner-year observations in the full sample,
which comprises all partnership-owner-year observations 2001-2014 in which the owner is a U.S. individual. See the notes to Table 1 for definitions,
replacing “S-corporation” with “partnership”, and see Sections 2-3 for more details.
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Table A.2: Industrial Composition of S-Corporation Profits (Total vs. Top 1-0.1% vs. Top 0.1%, Apportioned 2014)
Top 0.1% Owners Top 1-0.1% Owners
Industry (NAICS) Rank Profits Share of All Industry (NAICS) Rank Profits Share of All
Management of cos/enterprises (5511) 1 10100 1.018 Offices of physicians (6211) 1 9270 0.546
Other financial investment actvty (5239) 2 8270 0.893 Other professional/technical svc (5419) 2 4980 0.314
Automobile dealers (4411) 3 5930 0.853 Offices of dentists (6212) 3 4380 0.56
Other professional/technical svc (5419) 4 4780 0.389 Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389) 4 4210 0.33
Oil/gas extraction (2111) 5 3970 1.633 Legal svc (5411) 5 3560 0.352
Misc. durable goods merch whlsl (4239) 6 3920 0.654 Building equipment cntrctr (2382) 6 2850 0.329
Offices of physicians (6211) 7 3730 0.287 Insurance agencies/brokerages (5242) 7 2810 0.315
Other heavy constr (2379) 8 3700 0.75 Computer sys design/related svc (5415) 8 2800 0.29
Computer sys design/related svc (5415) 9 3580 0.399 Architectural/engineering svc (5413) 9 2780 0.369
Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389) 10 3490 0.372 Restaurants (7225) 10 2750 0.425
Management/techncl consulting svc (5416) 11 3350 0.479 Management/techncl consulting svc (5416) 11 2260 0.271
Other fabricated metal prod mfg. (3329) 12 3270 0.653 Nonresidential building constr (2362) 12 2140 0.343
Other miscellaneous mfg. (3399) 13 3250 0.705 Management of cos/enterprises (5511) 13 2000 0.091
Legal svc (5411) 14 2900 0.332 Misc. durable goods merch whlsl (4239) 14 1930 0.262
Misc. nondrbl gds merch whlsl (4249) 15 2770 0.672 Offices of other health practitioners (6213) 15 1920 0.315
Activities related to real estate (5313) 16 2500 0.737 Other fabricated metal prod mfg. (3329) 16 1870 0.269
Nonresidential building constr (2362) 17 2400 0.607 Automobile dealers (4411) 17 1850 0.204
Plastics product mfg. (3261) 18 2300 0.808 Other financial investment actvty (5239) 18 1700 0.145
Building equipment cntrctr (2382) 19 2120 0.347 Other miscellaneous mfg. (3399) 19 1700 0.249
Restaurants (7225) 20 2110 0.356 Activities related to real estate (5313) 20 1580 0.373
Insurance agencies/brokerages (5242) 21 2020 0.293 Building foundation/exterior cntrctr (2381) 21 1550 0.296
Architectural/engineering svc (5413) 22 1960 0.287 Misc. nondrbl gds merch whlsl (4249) 22 1450 0.228
Building material/supp dealers (4441) 23 1930 0.665 Residential building constr (2361) 23 1440 0.267
Nondepository credit intrmd (5222) 24 1800 0.722 Machinery/supply merch whlsl (4238) 24 1270 0.336
Machinery/supply merch whlsl (4238) 25 1780 0.553 Offices of real estate agents/brokers (5312) 25 1260 0.278
Residential building constr (2361) 26 1740 0.596 Oil/gas extraction (2111) 26 1140 0.438
Other miscellaneous store retailers (4539) 27 1570 0.524 Health/personal care stores (4461) 27 1090 0.461
Electric goods merch whlsl (4236) 28 1560 0.697 Advertising, pr,/related svc (5418) 28 1030 0.327
Indie artists, writers, performers (7115) 29 1520 0.606 Other heavy constr (2379) 29 1020 0.215
Employment svc (5613) 30 1460 0.575 Other miscellaneous store retailers (4539) 30 1000 0.32
Building foundation/exterior cntrctr (2381) 54 789 0.238 Nondepository credit intrmd (5222) 54 510 0.194
Notes: This table presents analogous statistics on the level of S-corporation profits by 4-digit industry, as in Table 2. We apportion S-corporation
profits pro rata to owners in either the top 0.1% or the top 1-0.1% and then aggregate those apportioned profits by industry.
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Table A.3: Industrial Composition of S-Corporation Profits (S-Corp vs Partnerships, Apportioned 2014)
Top 0.1% Owners Top 1-0.1% Owners
Industry (NAICS) S Rank S Profits P Rank P Profits Industry (NAICS) S Rank S Profits P Rank P Profits
Management of cos/enterprises (5511) 1 10100 4 4280 Offices of physicians (6211) 1 9270 2 6930
Other financial investment actvty (5239) 2 8270 1 33800 Other professional/technical svc (5419) 2 4980 7 1970
Automobile dealers (4411) 3 5930 14 1050 Offices of dentists (6212) 3 4380 16 642
Other professional/technical svc (5419) 4 4780 8 2500 Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389) 4 4210 23 526
Oil/gas extraction (2111) 5 3970 3 4660 Legal svc (5411) 5 3560 1 23700
Misc. durable goods merch whlsl (4239) 6 3920 20 722 Building equipment cntrctr (2382) 6 2850 44 237
Offices of physicians (6211) 7 3730 10 1270 Insurance agencies/brokerages (5242) 7 2810 13 816
Other heavy constr (2379) 8 3700 57 209 Computer sys design/related svc (5415) 8 2800 20 577
Computer sys design/related svc (5415) 9 3580 25 633 Architectural/engineering svc (5413) 9 2780 18 624
Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389) 10 3490 31 444 Restaurants (7225) 10 2750 11 942
Management/techncl consulting svc (5416) 11 3350 9 2060 Management/techncl consulting svc (5416) 11 2260 9 1570
Other fabricated metal prod mfg. (3329) 12 3270 42 335 Nonresidential building constr (2362) 12 2140 30 397
Other miscellaneous mfg. (3399) 13 3250 32 442 Management of cos/enterprises (5511) 13 2000 8 1740
Legal svc (5411) 14 2900 2 20900 Misc. durable goods merch whlsl (4239) 14 1930 32 358
Misc. nondrbl gds merch whlsl (4249) 15 2770 18 841 Offices of other health practitioners (6213) 15 1920 12 870
Activities related to real estate (5313) 16 2500 5 3700 Other fabricated metal prod mfg. (3329) 16 1870 43 237
Nonresidential building constr (2362) 17 2400 45 316 Automobile dealers (4411) 17 1850 22 560
Plastics product mfg. (3261) 18 2300 54 220 Other miscellaneous mfg. (3399) 18 1700 26 497
Building equipment cntrctr (2382) 19 2120 56 218 Other financial investment actvty (5239) 19 1700 3 6600
Restaurants (7225) 20 2110 22 698 Activities related to real estate (5313) 20 1580 10 1510
Insurance agencies/brokerages (5242) 21 2020 19 824 Building foundation/exterior cntrctr (2381) 21 1550 53 184
Architectural/engineering svc (5413) 22 1960 27 536 Misc. nondrbl gds merch whlsl (4249) 22 1450 40 259
Building material/supp dealers (4441) 23 1930 106 76 Residential building constr (2361) 23 1440 21 562
Nondepository credit intrmd (5222) 24 1800 12 1240 Machinery/supply merch whlsl (4238) 24 1270 47 229
Machinery/supply merch whlsl (4238) 25 1780 51 242 Offices of real estate agents/brokers (5312) 25 1260 33 352
Residential building constr (2361) 26 1740 16 978 Oil/gas extraction (2111) 26 1140 5 3520
Other miscellaneous store retailers (4539) 27 1570 55 220 Health/personal care stores (4461) 27 1090 42 243
Electric goods merch whlsl (4236) 28 1560 69 171 Advertising, pr,/related svc (5418) 28 1030 27 469
Indie artists, writers, performers (7115) 29 1520 50 245 Other heavy constr (2379) 29 1020 51 200
Employment svc (5613) 30 1460 64 176 Other miscellaneous store retailers (4539) 30 1000 61 144
Building foundation/exterior cntrctr (2381) 54 789 91 113 Nondepository credit intrmd (5222) 54 510 17 640
Notes: This table presents analogous statistics on the level of S-corporation and partnership profits by 4-digit industry, as in Table 3. We apportion
profits pro rata to owners in either the top 0.1% or the top 1-0.1% and then aggregate those apportioned profits by industry.
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Table A.4: Firm and Owner Counts by Industry for S-Corporations and Partnerships
Top 0.1% Owners Top 1-0.1% Owners
Industry (NAICS) S Firms S Owners P Firms P Owners Industry (NAICS) S Firms S Owners P Firms P Owners
Management of cos/enterprises (5511) 3636 6245 7623 56675 Offices of physicians (6211) 41975 63386 7464 36958
Other financial investment actvty (5239) 4030 6215 61491 349631 Other professional/technical svc (5419) 22841 32287 13013 32311
Automobile dealers (4411) 5236 7927 1418 2287 Offices of dentists (6212) 18413 21199 2119 3736
Other professional/technical svc (5419) 4291 5672 4444 8180 Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389) 10232 15169 2316 4027
Oil/gas extraction (2111) 1394 2045 7007 43209 Legal svc (5411) 13240 16808 8987 52849
Offices of physicians (6211) 4711 5817 1333 2440 Architectural/engineering svc (5413) 7516 11811 1900 3851
Misc. durable goods merch whlsl (4239) 1787 2522 877 1364 Restaurants (7225) 17683 29359 11202 31878
Management/techncl consulting svc (5416) 2785 3684 3116 5659 Building equipment cntrctr (2382) 5922 9185 768 1437
Computer sys design/related svc (5415) 1760 2444 1432 2404 Computer sys design/related svc (5415) 9607 14422 4502 10613
Other heavy constr (2379) 553 917 156 293 Insurance agencies/brokerages (5242) 9753 14568 3172 7383
Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389) 2046 2792 674 967 Management/techncl consulting svc (5416) 11746 16754 8530 22151
Other fabricated metal prod mfg. (3329) 1171 1821 212 379 Offices of other health practitioners (6213) 9978 13583 3185 10285
Other miscellaneous mfg. (3399) 1341 1999 777 1376 Nonresidential building constr (2362) 4591 7636 2076 4291
Misc. nondrbl gds merch whlsl (4249) 1131 1706 563 991 Misc. durable goods merch whlsl (4239) 5742 9096 2247 4543
Legal svc (5411) 1929 2241 1615 9871 Other fabricated metal prod mfg. (3329) 2843 5447 497 1089
Nonresidential building constr (2362) 1284 1937 726 1163 Building foundation/exterior cntrctr (2381) 3795 5458 682 1151
Activities related to real estate (5313) 10911 14973 47822 92816 Activities related to real estate (5313) 25314 39844 96524 258540
Plastics product mfg. (3261) 526 895 172 333 Other financial investment actvty (5239) 9022 15163 60591 579903
Restaurants (7225) 4991 6850 6401 11887 Other miscellaneous mfg. (3399) 3569 6448 1706 4831
Building equipment cntrctr (2382) 1115 1566 209 287 Automobile dealers (4411) 4504 9005 1278 2759
Insurance agencies/brokerages (5242) 1832 2434 951 1531 Residential building constr (2361) 6561 9172 6547 12319
Architectural/engineering svc (5413) 1085 1581 435 743 Offices of real estate agents/brokers (5312) 6397 8230 2797 5592
Machinery/supply merch whlsl (4238) 832 1228 217 333 Management of cos/enterprises (5511) 4866 14738 10637 169427
Building material/supp dealers (4441) 428 680 136 181 Machinery/supply merch whlsl (4238) 2761 4440 687 1329
Residential building constr (2361) 1629 2315 2868 4505 Misc. nondrbl gds merch whlsl (4249) 3596 5928 1372 3100
Nondepository credit intrmd (5222) 1163 1667 1748 3708 Health/personal care stores (4461) 4758 7120 1560 3780
Other miscellaneous store retailers (4539) 991 1363 609 891 Accounting/bookkeeping svc (5412) 4968 7101 2956 14985
Electric goods merch whlsl (4236) 498 744 150 270 Oil/gas extraction (2111) 3042 5100 10131 156560
Depository credit intrmd (5221) 408 1204 52 162 Other personal svc (8129) 6599 9188 5271 10474
Grocery/related product whlsl (4244) 671 1046 283 558 Advertising, pr,/related svc (5418) 3922 5529 2162 4488
Notes: This table presents counts of the number of firms and owners by 4-digit industry, ranked by the level of S-corporation profits for firms owned
by the top 0.1% and the top 1-0.1% respectively. The first column shows the number of S-corporations in 2014. The second column shows the number
of S-corporation owners in 2014. The third and fourth columns show the same statistics, but for partnerships.
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Table A.5: Construction of the Owner Deaths Analysis Sample
Step Sample Size at End of Step
Distinct firms 2005-2010 5,680,063
Restrict to firms with
139,391
one owner death 2005-2010
Restrict to dying
22,753
owners in the top 1%
Restrict to dying
7,718
owners under age 65
Restrict to firms with
2,627substantial pre-period
economic activity
Restrict to observations
2,552with valid industry
Match to at least one
2,509
counterfactual firm
Notes: This table lists the sample sizes at each of seven steps in the construction of the owner deaths
analysis sample, detailed in Section 5.1. The sample construction begins with all distinct S-corporations in
the 2005-2010 subset of our paper’s main sample. The second step further restricts to “owner-death” firms:
those with exactly one firm-owner-year observation in our main sample 2001-2014 in which the owner died
in the year of or immediately following the observation, as well as to firm in which that one firm-owner-year
observation lies in a year t ∈ 2005− 2010. The third step further restricts to firms with dying owners in the
top 1% of the t−1 U.S. personal income distribution. The fourth step further restricts to dying owners aged
under 65 on December 31 of year t. The fifth step further restricts to firms with at least $100,000 in sales in
2014 dollars in at least one year in [t−4, t−1], positive sales in all years [t−4, t−1], and positive employment
in some year [t−4, t−1]. The sixth step further restricts to firms with a three-digit NAICS industry code
strictly greater than 0 and strictly less than 999. The seventh step further restricts attention to owner-death
firms with at least one match to a “counterfactual” firm that met the same [t−4, t−1] firm requirements,
match the owner-death firm on three-digit industry and t − 1 sales decile, and have a year-t owner who
matches the dying owner on t − 1 income fractile and five-year age bin. The owner deaths analysis sample
comprises 2,509 owner-death firms matched to 315,039 counterfactual firms, each observed for the nine years
[t−4, t+4].
78
Table A.6: Profit Components in 2001 levels
Industry Profits ($ B) Profitability Workers per Owner Owners per Firm Firms % Total Profits
Panel A: All Owners
Overall 148.89 3.67 13.55 1.77 1,695,647 100.00
Agriculture & Forestry 0.60 0.77 8.88 2.37 37,195 0.40
Construction & Mining 27.71 5.92 11.54 1.62 250,637 18.61
Manufacturing 20.44 4.98 18.37 2.30 97,064 13.73
Retail & Wholesale Trade 35.90 4.28 12.51 1.79 374,865 24.11
Info & Professional Svcs 40.86 3.89 11.96 1.74 505,454 27.44
Health Care 12.73 4.70 14.39 1.50 125,059 8.55
Entertnmt, Food & Hotels 5.28 0.74 24.49 1.99 147,020 3.54
Other Svcs 4.71 2.32 9.28 1.56 140,325 3.16
Panel B: Top 1-0.1% Owners
Overall 48.38 4.25 19.68 2.37 243,682 100.00
Agriculture & Forestry 0.33 1.73 14.38 3.48 3,811 0.68
Construction & Mining 8.47 7.00 21.61 2.10 26,719 17.50
Manufacturing 5.35 4.37 19.98 3.15 19,478 11.05
Retail & Wholesale Trade 10.97 5.02 18.69 2.36 49,515 22.68
Info & Professional Svcs 13.06 4.05 16.57 2.41 80,817 26.99
Health Care 6.39 6.87 15.62 1.76 33,902 13.21
Entertnmt, Food & Hotels 2.19 1.13 35.83 2.82 19,190 4.52
Other Svcs 1.43 3.30 22.56 2.16 8,913 2.96
Panel C: Top 0.1% Owners
Overall 83.03 8.68 42.14 3.31 68,707 100.00
Agriculture & Forestry 0.64 5.19 25.36 4.21 1,156 0.77
Construction & Mining 13.71 13.46 46.48 2.84 7,704 16.51
Manufacturing 18.27 13.25 43.30 4.12 7,740 22.00
Retail & Wholesale Trade 23.67 10.05 48.95 2.86 16,813 28.51
Info & Professional Svcs 19.22 6.95 35.60 3.50 22,179 23.15
Health Care 3.40 6.41 38.99 2.88 4,733 4.10
Entertnmt, Food & Hotels 2.93 2.65 47.69 3.65 6,346 3.53
Other Svcs 0.96 3.74 51.36 2.91 1,718 1.16
Notes: This table follows the decomposition of profits into its elements as defined in Table 5. Table A.6 shows the levels of profitability and scale
metrics in 2001.
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Table A.7: Profit Components in 2014 levels
Industry Profits ($ B) Profitability Workers per Owner Owners per Firm Firms % Total Profits
Panel A: All Owners
Overall 344.72 7.24 10.84 1.58 2,771,211 100.00
Agriculture & Forestry 6.28 5.58 9.35 2.13 56,445 1.82
Construction & Mining 46.00 8.78 9.12 1.50 381,801 13.34
Manufacturing 48.44 13.64 14.97 2.07 114,645 14.05
Retail & Wholesale Trade 75.40 8.45 10.15 1.62 542,409 21.87
Info & Professional Svcs 106.04 8.17 9.37 1.56 886,754 30.76
Health Care 35.56 7.28 11.88 1.36 303,440 10.31
Entertnmt, Food & Hotels 15.63 1.88 19.59 1.80 235,959 4.53
Other Svcs 10.90 4.34 7.30 1.44 237,892 3.16
Panel B: Top 1-0.1% Owners
Overall 104.07 8.12 17.62 2.10 346,006 100.00
Agriculture & Forestry 1.99 8.04 12.52 3.13 6,335 1.92
Construction & Mining 14.46 10.93 21.38 2.03 30,471 13.90
Manufacturing 11.55 11.36 17.48 2.75 21,170 11.10
Retail & Wholesale Trade 20.25 9.51 16.53 2.09 61,559 19.46
Info & Professional Svcs 30.58 7.99 15.22 2.17 115,647 29.39
Health Care 17.16 10.81 14.24 1.60 69,559 16.49
Entertnmt, Food & Hotels 5.02 2.33 30.81 2.49 28,072 4.82
Other Svcs 2.92 5.74 21.26 1.92 12,474 2.81
Panel C: Top 0.1% Owners
Overall 160.38 14.86 41.10 3.18 82,605 100.00
Agriculture & Forestry 2.12 14.62 19.30 4.62 1,629 1.32
Construction & Mining 17.93 21.15 43.63 2.69 7,220 11.18
Manufacturing 34.41 26.66 38.04 3.85 8,805 21.45
Retail & Wholesale Trade 42.70 16.74 47.77 2.66 20,104 26.62
Info & Professional Svcs 47.30 13.19 37.04 3.70 26,142 29.49
Health Care 8.11 10.11 40.26 2.50 7,968 5.06
Entertnmt, Food & Hotels 5.96 4.47 50.92 3.08 8,517 3.72
Other Svcs 1.79 7.66 45.84 2.44 2,089 1.12
Notes: This table follows the decomposition of profits into its elements as defined in Table 5. Table A.7 shows the levels of profitability and scale
metrics in 2014.
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Table A.8: Decomposition of Profit Growth by State, Top 1-0.1% Owners
Share of Profit Growth (%)
State Profit Growth Rate Profitability Workers per Owner Owners per Firm Firms % Total Profits (2014)
Overall 120.68 80.19 -11.51 -14.62 45.94 100.00
AK 119.89 50.01 -21.34 -3.75 75.09 0.38
AL 124.86 58.19 -1.57 -3.42 46.80 1.33
AR 155.50 72.10 -3.83 -25.51 57.24 0.88
AZ 130.88 76.97 -31.54 -14.35 68.92 1.66
CA 183.50 74.13 -31.28 -13.95 71.10 12.35
CO 123.08 73.59 -11.89 -15.58 53.88 2.51
CT 172.88 98.51 8.00 -11.46 4.96 0.90
DE 75.80 190.51 -108.36 -17.09 34.95 0.28
FL 86.12 87.48 -21.34 -17.14 51.00 8.42
GA 100.51 53.30 12.06 -14.34 48.98 3.30
HI 113.90 51.77 13.73 -19.26 53.76 0.25
IA 185.36 77.31 -21.70 -10.26 54.65 1.20
ID 201.18 44.15 6.14 -9.49 59.20 0.64
IL 80.27 95.91 -13.49 -16.07 33.65 4.37
IN 51.45 126.57 -14.60 -35.64 23.67 2.19
KS 141.89 86.29 -24.97 -16.26 54.94 1.10
KY 45.93 125.11 -43.29 -13.82 32.00 1.06
LA 142.80 84.32 -37.51 -10.21 63.40 1.77
MA 66.40 67.72 16.76 -16.81 32.33 2.29
MD 87.33 84.05 -12.34 -14.87 43.16 1.73
ME 78.75 48.97 39.66 -9.37 20.74 0.39
MI 113.27 86.21 -2.38 -19.70 35.87 2.81
MN 121.67 75.75 4.00 -13.58 33.84 2.48
MO 128.22 78.79 -0.83 -15.98 38.02 1.80
MS 143.14 47.35 31.05 -24.17 45.77 0.65
MT 181.95 44.42 6.55 -15.83 64.86 0.48
NC 116.94 70.97 2.11 -16.12 43.04 2.69
ND 466.14 54.49 -12.62 -7.84 65.97 0.64
NE 216.37 54.22 4.64 -16.40 57.54 0.85
NH 105.30 72.28 34.41 -9.95 3.27 0.17
NJ 59.83 140.35 -9.94 -21.36 -9.05 2.34
NM 93.29 88.00 -23.14 -12.31 47.45 0.46
NV 130.58 79.60 -23.92 -16.49 60.80 1.02
NY 67.41 100.52 -2.26 -17.18 18.92 4.80
OH 95.06 119.29 -32.10 -14.21 27.03 3.42
OK 146.22 72.78 -11.52 -24.67 63.41 1.55
OR 233.35 77.41 -12.20 -12.24 47.03 1.34
PA 122.87 94.12 -4.71 -12.05 22.63 3.90
RI 30.17 190.46 -75.78 -22.75 8.07 0.38
SC 71.50 69.68 -6.88 -18.58 55.78 1.17
SD 187.67 61.15 -1.12 -11.41 51.38 0.54
TN 193.03 71.19 14.43 -8.80 23.18 0.42
TX 255.55 59.76 -1.02 -13.46 54.71 7.77
UT 262.24 38.11 11.27 -14.24 64.86 1.25
VA 116.57 68.08 1.13 -13.56 44.35 2.46
VT 127.28 118.76 -33.82 3.85 11.21 0.22
WA 162.73 71.03 -20.92 -6.36 56.25 2.68
WI 104.49 64.56 7.14 -11.97 40.27 1.98
WV 76.54 100.36 -5.80 -21.68 27.12 0.33
WY 179.99 67.70 -32.07 -2.86 67.23 0.38
Notes: See Table 5 for a description of the calculations.
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Table A.9: Decomposition of Profit Growth by State, Top 0.1% Owners
Share of Profit Growth (%)
State Profit Growth Rate Profitability Workers per Owner Owners per Firm Firms % Total Profits (2014)
Overall 107.43 72.74 2.45 -4.84 29.65 100.00
AK 229.13 39.88 -6.41 9.60 56.93 0.26
AL 77.62 16.05 33.78 9.63 40.54 0.95
AR 141.65 43.36 -7.17 -6.70 70.51 0.70
AZ 25.64 362.11 -332.38 -16.53 86.81 1.04
CA 78.77 68.26 -32.06 -5.42 69.22 12.46
CO 62.25 67.31 8.14 -12.51 37.05 1.76
CT 98.84 123.76 -6.80 2.78 -19.74 1.55
DE 70.01 -319.39 418.72 18.29 -17.61 0.33
FL 64.67 78.95 8.22 -25.39 38.22 6.15
GA 93.49 85.02 -15.73 3.24 27.47 2.62
HI 155.36 69.99 37.85 -38.90 31.06 0.17
IA 168.33 56.67 -2.79 7.20 38.91 0.99
ID 219.23 44.66 30.66 -11.10 35.77 0.48
IL 51.85 137.14 -42.10 7.26 -2.31 5.12
IN 87.39 3.66 109.90 -31.88 18.32 1.97
KS 156.00 75.24 -19.73 9.28 35.21 1.22
KY 43.55 48.68 55.24 -0.01 -3.91 0.72
LA 165.56 25.16 -11.20 22.19 63.85 1.86
MA 308.95 77.52 27.77 -14.70 9.40 3.38
MD 5.40 -190.80 182.74 -98.75 206.81 1.33
ME 19.91 211.78 -27.59 -17.64 -66.55 0.21
MI 141.12 49.05 24.39 -4.02 30.58 3.38
MN 74.98 141.84 -65.38 10.57 12.98 2.55
MO -620.35 1.90
MS 72.99 123.87 -88.05 17.23 46.95 0.50
MT 294.39 71.43 -30.13 -1.95 60.64 0.36
NC 93.47 96.69 -21.39 -7.70 32.41 2.01
ND 861.41 48.95 -4.59 -1.77 57.41 0.76
NE 151.91 71.59 -42.50 7.50 63.41 0.84
NH 96.93 117.24 26.51 0.55 -44.31 0.14
NJ 48.29 146.92 -4.70 -13.87 -28.35 3.06
NM 113.40 86.43 -26.63 19.52 20.68 0.54
NV 58.39 114.95 -14.73 -30.00 29.77 1.13
NY 96.95 101.28 24.67 -19.64 -6.30 6.92
OH 91.17 71.15 18.15 -8.38 19.09 3.33
OK 171.94 32.52 24.21 -12.38 55.65 2.07
OR 117.32 67.44 -3.37 -11.14 47.07 0.91
PA 102.96 82.84 8.25 -1.88 10.80 3.73
RI 40.65 89.49 -64.68 70.85 4.34 0.25
SC 76.68 0.45 141.52 -67.17 25.20 0.63
SD 379.15 54.81 7.10 -6.69 44.77 0.57
TN 234.40 113.00 -29.43 2.86 13.57 0.69
TX 227.57 71.97 -15.31 -8.58 51.92 8.94
UT 83.80 29.14 -12.65 -3.85 87.36 0.88
VA 62.00 59.40 -7.46 6.56 41.50 1.70
VT 62.30 70.02 63.26 -14.64 -18.64 0.11
WA 120.71 57.24 -9.98 6.18 46.56 2.02
WI 231.27 41.36 29.01 7.79 21.83 4.15
WV 62.47 84.45 -161.66 115.77 61.44 0.24
WY 99.51 89.46 -2.87 -85.78 99.19 0.41
Notes: See Table 5 for a description of the calculations. Top 0.1% owned S-Corporations in Missouri
witnessed decreases in all components of the profit decomposition. Log calculations dropped negative growth
rates for this segment of the sample.
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B Model Appendix
B.1 Firm Scale and Profitability
B.1.1 Determinants of Firm Scale
Firm scale for firm j is determined by equating marginal revenue and marginal costs. After
cost minimization, cost is Cj = S
′
jy
1
γ , where S ′j = A
−1
γ
j θ
−αE
γ
j w
αL
γ r
αK
γ κ is related to terms that
shift firm supply, κ = γ
[
α−αLL α
−αK
K
(
αE
(
ε
1+ε
))−αE
1+1ε
] 1
γ
is a constant, and γ = αL + αK +
αE
1+ 1
ε
are the effective returns to scale.
The firm problem (abstracting from fixed costs) is:
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y
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Thus, profits are:
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We can also express profits as a markup over costs:
pij =
[(
η
1 + η
)
1
γ
− 1
]
Cj (10)
where Cj =
[
D
1
η
j
(
η
η+1
)
1
γ
] 1γ
1
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S ′j
1+ 1η
1
η+
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γ .48
48The first order conditions for each factor show that factor payments will be a fixed share of sales (e.g.,
αL
(
1
η + 1
)
pjyj
Lj
= w ⇒ αL
(
1
η + 1
)
Salesj = wLj).
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B.1.2 Determinants of Firm Profitability
The gross markup of sales over costs µj is determined by demand elasticity and output
elasticities αK , αL and αE:
µj =
p(y∗j )y
∗
j
C(y∗j )
=
1
γ
(
η
η + 1
)
(11)
Generally, firms are more profitable when the gap between prices and average total costs is
large. Costs are Cj = S
′
jy
1
γ
j , so average costs are cj = S
′
jy
1
γ
−1
j . Hence, the gap between prices
and average total costs is D
−1
η
j y
1
η − S ′jy
1
γ
−1
j . Additionally, equation 7 abstracted from fixed
costs, but costs can easily be redefined to add fixed costs. With fixed costs, the gap between
price and average total cost can grow as fixed costs are spread over larger quantities, which
can increase firm profitability.
B.1.3 Factor payments and factor shares
From the FOCs, it follows that factor payments are:
• Non-owner labor: wLj(i) = αL
(
1
ηj(i)
+ 1
)
pj(i)yj(i)
• Capital: rKj(i) = αK
(
1
ηj(i)
+ 1
)
pj(i)yj(i)
• Owner payments are the sum of:
– Compensation for owner effort: αE
1+ 1
εj(i)
(
1
ηj(i)
+ 1
)
pj(i)yj(i).
– Profits: pij(i) =
[
1−
(
αL + αK +
αE
1+ 1
εj(i)
)(
1
ηj(i)
+ 1
)]
pj(i)yj(i)
Thus, factor shares are:
sL = αL
(
1 +
1
ηj(i)
)
(12)
sK = αK
(
1 +
1
ηj(i)
)
(13)
sE =
αE
1 + 1
εj(i)
(
1 +
1
ηj(i)
)
(14)
spi = 1− sL − sE − sK (15)
84
where sL is the non-owner labor share, sK is the capital share, sE is the owner labor share,
spi is the owner profit share, and sowner = sE + spi is the total share of payments accruing to
owner(s).
B.2 Product Demand Elasticity and Firm Scale
Inelastic product demand elasticity η may be a function of firm scale, as in the case of
dominant local firms.49 Suppose DM(p) is the market demand for a given product, and let
S0(p) be the supply from the non-dominant firms in the market. If the firm j faces a residual
market demand curve y(p) = DM(p) − S0(p), then differentiation and expressing terms as
elasticities yields:
|ηj| = |η
M |
sj
+
1− sj
sj
εS (16)
where ηM is the market product demand elasticity, sj is the market share for firm j and
εS the elasticity of supply for non-dominant firms. Equation 16 shows the product demand
elasticity facing the firm will be more inelastic when (i) the market demand elasticity ηM is
less elastic, (ii) the firm’s market share sj is larger, and (iii) the supply elasticity of other
firms εS is less elastic. Note that the relationship between market share and market power is
non-linear — small changes in market share can cause large changes in markups, especially
for firms with large initial market shares. Also note that, with firm entry, εS = ∞, which
corresponds to a perfectly competitive output market.
49Our discussion of η and scale in this appendix subsection draws heavily on Kevin Murphy’s price theory
lecture discussion of dominant local firms, in which Murphy highlights these points. See Kaplow and Shapiro
(2007) for a derivation of equation 16 and additional analysis.
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B.3 Identifying αE accounting for changes to other inputs
If owner effort E also affects factor demand, then identifying αE requires adjusting for
changes in factor inputs. Totally differentiating sales yields,
dSales
dE
=
dD
−1
η (ALαLKαKEαE)
1
η
+1
dE
= −1
η
dD
dE
Sales
D
+
(
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1
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)
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dE
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A
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(
1 +
1
η
)
Sales
E
+ αL
(
1 +
1
η
)
dL
dE
Sales
L
+ αK
(
1 +
1
η
)
dK
dE
Sales
K
where the first three terms are the effects of owners on the demand shifter D, TFP A and
owner effort E, and the last two terms are the factor adjustment terms. Multiplying by E
Sales
to convert terms into elasticities, we have
βSales,E = −1
η
βD,E +
(
1 +
1
η
)
βA,E + αE
(
1 +
1
η
)
+ αL
(
1 +
1
η
)
βL,E + αK
(
1 +
1
η
)
βK,E
(17)
where βX,E denotes the elasticity of X with respect to E. The labor and capital elasticities
are closely related (since K = αKw
αLr
L), so we can combine the factor adjustment terms:
βSales,E = −1
η
βD,E +
(
1 +
1
η
)
βA,E + αE
(
1 +
1
η
)
+ (αL + αK)
(
1 +
1
η
)
βL,E (18)
This step is useful because of difficulties associated with measuring capital well in the data.
Therefore, we can identify each component of the factor adjustment term as follows:
1. The coefficient on βL,E is the sum of the non-owner labor share αL
(
1 + 1
η
)
and capital
share αK
(
1 + 1
η
)
, which we can identify from the non-owner factor share, which equals
wL+rK
py
= (αL + αK) (1 +
1
η
) where y represents net output so that py represents value
added (rather than value added plus intermediate inputs).50 Note that owner payments
as a share of sales represent two components: the entrepreneur labor share sE =
(E/θ)1+
1
ε
py
= αE
1+ 1
ε
(1 + 1
η
) and the profit share spi = 1− sL − sE − sK .
50For example, if owner payments are roughly 40% of overall payments, then the term (αL + αK) (1 +
1
η )
equals 1-0.4=0.6.
86
2. βL,E is the estimated elasticity of employment, which we estimate from the effect of
owner death on employment.
In short, we quantify the factor adjustment term by multiplying the non-owner factor share
by the employment elasticity estimate. If there are no effects of the owner on appeal D or
TFP A, then the difference between the sales elasticity βSales,E and this factor adjustment
term represents αE
(
1 + 1
η
)
. Therefore, dividing this difference by
(
1 + 1
η
)
yields an estimate
of αE. In terms of implementing these steps empirically, we have:
αE =
βSales,E − (1− sowner)βL,E(
1 + 1
η
) (19)
where βSales,E is the effect of an owner death on log sales, sowner = sE +spi is the owner share
of payments, βL,E is effect of an owner death on log employment, and η is the product demand
elasticity, which is typically calibrated to take values between −10 to −4, see for example,
Sua´rez Serrato and Zidar (2016) who estimate η = −4.5 and Coibion, Gorodnichenko and
Wieland (2012) who use η = −7. Less elastic product demand elasticities are also possible
for certain types of firms. Finally, note that in the perfect competition case (i.e., η = −∞),
no adjustment for the product demand elasticity term is required as
(
1 + 1
η
)
≈ 1.
Table B.1: Parameters to quantify αE
Parameter Value Source
βSales,E .30 Appendix Figure A.12A
Average owner share sowner .45 Main sample
βSales,L .23 Appendix Figure A.12B
Product demand elasticity η -4.5 Sua´rez Serrato and Zidar (2016)
Notes: This table shows the values and sources for parameters used to quantify αE in section 5.2. Since the
average dying owner owned only 60.2% of the owner-death firm, we scale the estimates Appendix Figure
A.12A and Figure A.12B by 1/.602 as in the main analysis to obtain estimates in elasticity terms for a 100%
change in owner effort. The average owner share sowner is the ratio of aggregate owner payments (i.e., profits
plus owner wages) to aggregate profits plus all W-2 payments (including owner wages) among the top 1%
owned firms. Estimates that include interest payments in the denominator or alternative definitions of the
numerator (e.g., officer compensation plus profits) result in fairly similar aggregate owner share estimates
for top 1% owners. On an unweighted basis, the average owner share of top 1% firms is roughly two-thirds,
which results in a higher estimate of αˆE ≈ .33.
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B.4 Scarcity versus Accumulation (Prices versus Quantities)
Log linearizing demand yields:
yˆDj = Dˆj + ηpˆj (20)
where yˆDj is the percent change in the quantity demanded, Dˆj is the shift in demand, and
ηpˆj is movement along the demand curve where η is the demand elasticity and pˆj is the
percentage change in price. Similarly, the percent change in the quantity supplied is,
ySj = Sˆj + 
S pˆj (21)
where
Sj = µ
− γ
1−γ
j A
1
1−γ
j θ
αE
1−γ
j w
−αL
1−γ r
−αK
1−γ κ−
γ
1−γ
=
(
η
η + 1
)− γ
1−γ
γ
γ
1−γ
[
Ajθ
αE
j
(αL
w
)αL (αK
r
)αK [
αE
(
ε
1 + ε
)] αE
1+1ε
] 1
1−γ
is a supply shifter, which is a function of the markup µj (see equation 11), TFP Aj, owner
talent θj, and factor prices, and 
S = γ
1−γ is the supply elasticity, where γ = αL + αK +
αE
1+ 1
ε
are the effective returns to scale.51
In equilibrium, the product market clears and the change in quantity demanded and the
quantity supplied have to be the same.
yˆDj = yˆ
S
j
Dˆj + ηpˆj = Sˆj + 
S pˆj
51Supply from other firms could affect market level supply, which would work through the firm’s product
market elasticity being more elastic (due to higher εS in equation 16). Similarly, firm entry could affect
supply, and market supply would be the product of the number of firms and average firm supply. We discuss
the forces governing entry in section B.5.
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Thus, the percentage change in prices is:
pˆj =
Dˆj − Sˆj
S − η (22)
We can use this price change to determine the quantity change:
yˆj = Sˆj + 
S
(
Dˆj − Sˆj
S − η
)
yˆj =
(
−ηSˆj + SDˆj
S − η
)
(23)
which shows that the quantity change is an elasticity-weighted average of shifts in supply
and demand. The sales change is the sum of price and quantity changes:
Ŝalesj = pˆj + yˆj =
(1 + S)Dˆj − (1 + η)Sˆj
S − η (24)
Since sales are a markup µj over costs, we have the following expression for profit changes:
pˆij = Ŝalesj +
̂(
1− 1
µj
)
(25)
Finally, note that the relative importance of price and quantity changes are:
pˆj
Ŝalesj
=
Dˆj − Sˆj
(1 + S)Dˆj − (1 + η)Sˆj
(26)
yˆj
Ŝalesj
=
−ηSˆj + SDˆj
(1 + S)Dˆj − (1 + η)Sˆj
(27)
Therefore, if there is a net demand increase (i.e., Dˆj − Sˆj > 0), most of the change in sales
(and thus profits via higher sales in equation 25) will be due to higher prices rather than
higher quantities when S is small. Recall that S = γ
1−γ , where γ = αL + αK +
αE
1+1/ε
and ε
may vary by scale.
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B.5 Firm Entry
This section describes a simple model for considering how much firm entry will respond to
firm profit increases. People can decide to be entrepreneurs or workers. A person will choose
to be an entrepreneur if their utility of being an entrepreneur ve + νie exceeds their utility of
being a worker vw + νiw. The utility of being an entrepreneur is the sum of the systematic
component enjoyed by all entrepreneurs ve and an idiosyncratic component νie, which varies
across people and can reflect non-pecuniary tastes for entrepreneurship, location-specific
tastes (e.g., a person would have to move to a different location to start a physician practice
if it is profitable there), person-specific fixed costs for setting up business, or other factors.
Similarly, the systematic and idiosyncratic components of the utility of being a worker are
vw and νiw, respectively.
Suppose that νik for k ∈ {e, w} is i.i.d., mean zero, and type I extreme value with scale
σ, which means that the relative tastes of person i for being a worker ξi = eiw − eie are
distributed according to a logistic distribution: ξi/σ ∼ logistic(0,1).52 The share of people
who choose to be entrepreneurs Se is
Se = Λ(
ve − vw
σ
) (28)
where Λ(·) ≡ exp(.)
1+exp(.)
is the standard logistic c.d.f. Rearranging this expression yields,
σΛ−1(Se) = ve − vw (29)
which shows that the supply of entrepreneurs is closely linked to premium people receive from
entrepreneurship relative to working. Specifically, σΛ−1(Se) is effectively the supply curve of
entrepreneurs. The parameter σ, which governs the importance of idiosyncratic preferences
and scales a weakly increasing function Λ−1(·), determines both the level of entrepreneurship
S∗e and how responsive new entrepreneurship is to changes in entrepreneurial payoffs.
The premium to entrepreneurship ve− vw depends on how profits and counterfactual en-
trepreneur wages are modeled. For a person with talent θ and a market price per efficiency
52We follow the mathematical setup of the two city residential choice model of Kline and Moretti (2014)
since the analytical structure of a binary discrete choice is quite similar to our setting.
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unit w, let the difference between the profits from entrepreneurship and labor compensation
be pi(w, θ)−wθ, where pi(w, θ) is the expression from equation 10 and the person’s compen-
sation as a worker is the product of wages and talent, as in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny
(1991).53
σΛ−1(Se) = pi(w, θ)− wθ (30)
Thus, if idiosyncratic factors ξi are quite important (i.e., large σ), then firm entry won’t
be very responsive to a given increase in firm profits.54 There are other ways to model the
outside labor market options of firm owners besides wθ, but the qualitative forces shaping
the level and responsiveness of firm entry, such as the importance of ξi and the relative
returns to talent, will remain important.
53Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) model talent as determining firm TFP, notice that in the expression
for profits pij =
[(
η
1+η
)
1
γ − 1
] [
D
1
η
j
(
η
η+1
)
1
γ
] 1γ
1
η
+
γ−1
γ
[
A
−1
γ
j θ
−αE
γ
j w
αL
γ r
αK
γ κ
] 1+ 1η
1
η
+
γ−1
γ , firm TFP A and owner
talent θ enter the profit expression very similarly. The only difference is that θ is scaled differently as higher
talent is raised to the exponent −αEγ rather than
−1
γ . However, the feature that higher talent generates
increasing returns for entrepreneurs remains, and shapes how the allocation of talent is determined.
54Equation 30 treats wages as exogenous, so the implied equilibrium share of people who are entrepreneurs
S∗e is determined by where threshold value pi(w, θ)−wθ intersects the σ-scaled supply curve, i.e., σΛ−1(Se).
Extending the model to allow for wages to depend on the share of the population who works, i.e., w(Se),
would provide a congestion force and result in similar analytics to the role of rental prices in the two city
model of Kline and Moretti (2014).
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